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ABSTRACT 
This thesis focuses on the medical as part of the public health response to 
Hurricane Katrina, specific to the issues of the private, non-governmental health 
professional. A brief survey was completed by 39 state level Bioterrorism Hospital 
Coordinators. Information obtained highlights the issues of the inability to deploy these 
private health professionals. Traditional governmental mutual aid mechanisms do not 
cover private non-governmental health professionals for workers compensation and death 
benefits. 
A review of the potential deployment mechanisms provides insight to the 
challenges and complexity specific to private health professionals. The motivation for 
volunteerism highlights the importance of targeting volunteer activities to the motivation 
of the individual volunteer. Investigating the impact thwarting the private, non-
governmental health professionals may have on future planning and response activities 
reinforce the need to modify the structures currently in place. 
The National Response Plan stresses the importance of including private industry 
into emergency preparedness and response strategies. This thesis outlines a strategy to 
pilot a project working with an established state volunteer registry by providing 
mechanisms to federalize those pre-identified, pre-credentialed volunteer health 
professionals. Once completed, this pilot could be expanded to other states, ensuring a 
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A. BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES 
Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast area on August 29, 2005. Although it was 
anticipated to be a significant storm, the consequences of the Category three storm 
exceeded all predictions. The storm hit Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama causing 
major disruption of all services. The destruction of homes and businesses across the 
region was devastating, and interruption of the ability to deliver medical services both 
from an infrastructure and human resources standpoint was catastrophic.  
The United States’ current medical infrastructure distinguished itself from 
traditional public health during the 1877 smallpox campaign. It was at this time that the 
focus on community prevention for public health and the specialized, technical medical 
care of the individual began to divide public and private health disciplines.1 This division 
has continued to evolve over time as evidenced by governmental local and state public 
health agencies focusing on their specific populations’ health and wellness, and only 
minimal governmental direct medical care facilities. The significance of this disparity is 
that in Michigan and many other states over 80% of medical health resources are owned 
and operated by private industry. There are no governmental or regulatory obligations for 
private, non-governmental health providers to engage in planning or responses to public 
health or other significant disaster events outside their own jurisdiction. Consistent with 
the medical communities health missions, private, non-governmental health professionals 
are willing to assist when needed. This was evident during the Hurricane Katrina 
response. Challenges exist, however, with the ability to incorporate these health 
professionals into the mechanisms that currently exist for deploying resources under 
governmental declarations of emergencies, Incidents of National Significance or other 
health related emergency. An Incident of National Significance is defined as those high-
impact events that require a combined, coordinated response of federal, state, local, tribal 
and private sector, including non-governmental organizations to save lives and minimize 
                                                 
1 Laurie Garrett, Betrayal of Trust (New York: Hyperion, 2000), 291. 
2 
damages.2 Critical issues exist in the areas of financial remuneration, workers’ 
compensation and death benefits.3 This issue came to the forefront during Hurricane 
Katrina when health professionals across the country were identified, registered, and 
agreed to assist but were unable to do so due to a lack of clear mechanisms and consistent 
information. Very few states were able to successfully deploy a team of volunteers. This 
inconsistency continues to significantly impact the medical health response from both the 
process as well as the psychological impact to health disciplines and serves as the 
impetus to thoroughly review the events of Hurricane Katrina. This review will 
summarize the issues associated with aid, the ability or inability to successfully deploy 
resources, identify strategies, and suggest solutions to fill a significant gap in both local 
and federal governments’ processes to address the medical issues, focusing on health 
professionals’ surge capacity.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What are the lessons learned during the Hurricane Katrina response specific to the 
ability or inability to deploy private, non-governmental healthcare workers? Could 
thwarting those desiring to volunteer have a significant impact on utilizing these 
important resources in future Homeland Security initiatives? This thesis will identify a 
strategic plan and policy recommendations to address inclusion strategies for this 
valuable resource for Homeland Security preparedness and response at the state and 
federal levels. A pilot project for the state of Michigan will be proposed for 
consideration. This pilot could initiate a process to improve mutual aid processes and 
rectify the disparity with private, non-governmental health professional’s inclusion across 
the nation. 
C. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES 
• Assemble information on the various methods used to deploy resources 
including private, non-governmental health professionals to assist with the 
Hurricane Katrina response.  
                                                 
2 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, 2004. Available [online] 
http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/NRPbaseplan.pdf (accessed December 10, 2005). 
3  Federal Emergency Management Agency, Medical Care and Evacuations, FEMA: Public 
Assistance. Available [online] www.fema.gov/nims/mutual_aid.shtm (accessed July 17, 2005).  
3 
• Identify the unique challenges associated with private, non-governmental 
health professionals that differ from traditional public safety response 
disciplines. 
• Conduct a survey of each state's National Bioterrorism Hospital 
Preparedness Program focusing on the ability to assist with volunteer, 
non-governmental health professionals during the Hurricane Katrina 
response. 
• Review the potential psychological implications of thwarting volunteerism 
of healthcare professionals. 
• Develop a strategic plan which includes alternate methods and policy 
revisions to facilitate the deployment of private, non-governmental health 
professionals during a mass casualty event, recognizing the needs for 
adequate professional assurances and mutual aid agreements and/or 
compacts.  
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
Health professionals have a significant role to play in any large scale emergency. 
Not only do they possess a unique expertise, but a willingness to assist where needed. 
Current mutual aid agreements and compacts allow for the deployment of governmental 
resources, but lack the ability to enlist and deploy those disciplines with direct medical 
care provider’s expertise.  
The availability to surge health professionals during a governmental declaration 
of emergency, Incident of National Significance or other health emergency is an 
identified deficiency at the local, regional, state, and national level. The researcher 
explored these issues specific to Hurricane Katrina and has developed a strategic plan 
with specific changes to address this deficiency. These changes should reinforce the 
pledges made by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), via the National 
Response Plan, to partner with the private sector a priority.4  
                                                 
4 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, 2004. 
4 
A great deal of work needs to be done both now and in the future to address this 
complex issue. This thesis closes with a strategic plan that includes policy 
recommendations for consideration by any entity with responsibility to manage the 
medical aspects of a mass casualty event. These recommendations include referring to 
published and researched model mutual aid agreements and compact documents.5 
Finally, a proposed pilot project in Michigan will be outlined for implementation. The 
research related to this topic will have a significant impact on the health and welfare of 
citizens across the country. 
E. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
A critical review of the preparedness literature focusing on deployment of assets 
includes the methods and mechanisms surrounding mutual aid agreements and compacts. 
This literature is broad in focus and incorporates provisions for federal, state and local 
governmental agencies. The National Emergency Management Association (NEMA), in 
February 2004, established proposed model intrastate mutual aid legislation which was 
used to establish the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC).6 This has 
provided a framework for state and local governments to model agreements such as the 
Michigan Emergency Management Assistance Compact (MEMAC)7  These materials 
assist with policy development but also demonstrate deficiencies in disciplines and 
processes. The private health sector in Michigan and other states has begun to establish 
mutual aid agreements between like agencies but must expand to contribute to homeland 
security and defense. In addition, understanding the mechanisms of those deployed 
directly by FEMA under The Stafford Act8as well as those deployed by other professional 
organizations is critical in understanding the issues surrounding the deployment during 
Hurricane Katrina. 
                                                 
5 National Emergency Management Association, “Model Intrastate Mutual Aid Legislation,” EMAC 
2004. Available [online] 
http://www.emacweb.org/docs/Wide%20%Release%20Intrastate%20Mutual%20Aid.pdf (accessed August 
21, 2006). 
6 The National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) Intrastate Mutual Aid Working Group, 
"Proposed Model Intrastate Mutual Aid Legislation," The NEMA 2004 Mid-Year Conference held in 
Washington, DC, February 10–13, 2004, 3–4. 
7 The Michigan State Police Emergency Management Division, Michigan Emergency Management 
Assistance Compact (Lansing, MI: State of Michigan, 2004), 1. 
8 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act. Available [online] http://www.fema.gov/library/stafacts.htm (accessed June 27, 2005). 
5 
Additional literature is being released addressing the military role during the 
Katrina aftermath, specific to the care of a large number of casualties. The Terrorism and 
Domestic Response article outlines the role of the Department of Defense in Katrina 
including validation of the need to interface with and involve the private sector 
businesses, volunteer and professional organizations, national professional societies and 
academic institutions in planning and response activities, including personnel.9 
Critical to the literature review is a complex investigation of the legal issues 
associated with the deployment of human resources. Sources such as the experts at The 
Center for Law and the Public’s Health at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Universities 
provide a chronological analysis of the challenges associated with workers compensation 
and death benefits to those private, non-governmental health professionals called to 
action through various mechanisms specific to the Katrina response.10 
In addition to the above noted literature, supporting general governmental policy 
works are being published. The key sources include those from the Department of Health 
and Human Services, Congressional Research Service, National Governors Association, 
and Government Accounting Office publications that support the review and 
recommendations based on the Hurricane Katrina response. These ongoing additions to 
the compiled literature will provide a richer discussion surrounding the successful 
deployment and the challenges associated with health professional resources to assist 
with policy development recommendations for future research. 
Finally, published literature including after action reports for Hurricane Katrina 
provide new and varied perspective on the complex issues. Those involved with mutual 
aid and private healthcare will need to remain alert to newly published materials. 
F. EXPECTED FINDINGS AND POLICY OPTIONS 
This thesis investigates some of the challenges associated with the deployment of 
critical medical resources during a state of emergency. The review of Hurricane Katrina 
will assist in identifying deficiencies in the current system and formulating 
                                                 
9Donald F. Thompson, "Terrorism and Domestic Response Can DoD Help Get It Right?" Joint Force 
Quarterly, no. 40 (1st Quarter 2006): 20. 
10HRSA ESAR-VHP Legal & Regulatory Issue Project, The Center for Law and the Public's Health at 
Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Universities (Baltimore, MD: Center for Law and the Public's Health, 
2005), 2. 
6 
recommendations. It is anticipated that governmental agencies will have to make 
modifications to their state-based mutual aid compact, such as the Michigan Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact. In turn, the federal government will need to make 
modifications to mobilize this critical discipline during an Incident of National 
Significance or other public health emergency. A review of the Emergency Management 
Assistance Compact (EMAC) components as well as other mutual aid mechanisms 
demonstrates an opportunity to develop consistency across the country. These 
modifications may require updates to existing state and federal policies or the need to 
establish emergency executive orders when an event occurs. Executive orders may need 
to be established as part of comprehensive planning to ensure that all legal clearances are 
in place to addresses the issues of workers compensation and death benefits specific to 
private health professionals. 
In addition, healthcare facilities may need to modify their internal mechanisms 
utilized to deploy their professionals to assist outside their jurisdiction as well as those 
policies that outline the utilization of incoming health professionals during a large scale, 
governmental declared emergency. These recommendations could significantly improve 
mobilization of critical medical human resources, thus better serving all health and 
Homeland Security agencies and improving medical response. 
G. METHODOLOGY 
Research methodologies included an initial and on-going literature review. Since 
Hurricane Katrina is a relatively recent occurrence, true historical data are non-existent. 
Therefore, several methods were used to collect information and thus develop 
recommendations. 
A survey tool was developed and sent to the Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS), Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) Bioterrorism 
Hospital Coordinator for each of the states not significantly affected by Hurricane 
Katrina. This tool (see Appendix A) asked specific questions about the involvement of 
that particular state and their ability to mobilize private, non-governmental health 
professionals to the Hurricane Katrina effected areas. The investigator made every effort 
to receive at least a 60 percent response rate from those surveyed to assure the data would 
be deemed valid.  
7 
An extensive number of private and governmental meetings have been called to 
review after action reports on issues associated with Hurricane Katrina. Information from 
those meetings has contributed to the final strategic planning recommendations including 

























































II. AT THE ONSET—HEALTHCARE JURISDICTIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITIES 
The National Response Plan (NRP), released in December 2004, is the 
framework for all governmental and voluntary agencies to operate during a disaster. 
Under the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary at DHHS bears responsibility 
for Emergency Support Function (ESF) #8, specifically the coordination of public health 
and medical services. There are 15 designated functional areas within ESF #8 that DHHS 
and supporting agencies such as the American Red Cross bear responsibility for 
coordination: 
• Assessment of health/medical needs; 
• Health surveillance; 
• Medical care personnel; 
• Health/medical equipment and supplies; 
• Patient evacuation; 
• In-hospital care; 
• Food/drug/medical device safety; 
• Worker health/safety; 
• Radiological/chemical/biological hazards consultation; 
• Mental health care; 
• Public health information; 
• Vector control; 
• Potable water/wastewater and solid waste disposal; 
• Victim identification/mortuary services; and 
• Veterinary services.11 
The National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) consists of response teams, 
normally 20–35 persons that can deploy to a scene or event and set up field operations 
that are designed to be self sustaining for up to 72 hours, anticipating further federal 
support. They can also assist in the transportation from an impacted site to final care 
                                                 
11 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, vol. ESF #8, (Washington, DC, 2004), 
ESF #8– 2. 
10 
destination points. The medical professionals within NDMS are licensed to practice in at 
least one U.S. jurisdiction and are not considered federal employees unless deployed. 
Once deployed, they fall under the federal protections that include liability and 
compensation packages.12 
Initial actions following a potential major disaster or emergency includes the 
provision of Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs) and individual public health 
and medical personnel. DMATs are trained to provide triage, medical or surgical 
stabilization and continued monitoring until a final disposition and definitive medical 
care is delivered. Additionally, specialty DMATs can be deployed specific to events such 
as mass burn care, pediatrics, chemical or other complex needs. In addition, the federal 
government can mobilize other Department of Defense (DOD) and National Guard units, 
including Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) resources for specific medical 
missions.13 
During Katrina medical and public health assets provided excellent care to 
thousands of displaced patients with conditions ranging from acute injuries to chronic 
medical conditions requiring complex medical interventions. Many felt that medical and 
public health professionals were the true heroes of the response. These professionals 
often had to improvise due to a delay to staging areas and procurement of supplies.14 
The Association for Air Medical Services (AAMS), a private air transportation 
provider, represents 85 percent of all hospital transportation capabilities in the United 
States. They also maintain a web-based database, updated annually, listing air medical 
services and hospitals with the capacity to receive patients via this mechanism. Records 
indicate that during the entire Katrina response, only one governmental request was made 
for access and assistance with this database. However, consistent with humanitarian 
efforts, the AAMS companies provided support for medical evaluations without official 
contracts with hospitals or the government. A Mississippi EOC representative declined 
                                                 
12 Domestic Social Policy Division, Hurricane Katrina: The Public Health and Medical Response, 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005), CRS 12– 13. 
13 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, 9. 
14 The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned, by Frances Fragos Townsend, 
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism (Washington, DC, 2006), 47. 
11 
the offer of 25 helicopters accessible to their hospitals, through EMAC, from Florida 
transport agencies. Finally, personal networking and established health relationships also 
provided valuable resources, often undocumented in the literature, in the absence of 
formal agreements.15 
Post-event publications state that there were not enough medical resources and 
teams in position prior to landfall of the hurricane. This led to unnecessary delays in 
getting the equipment and supplies to the right people. Those that were deployed or 
remained in the area experienced compounding problems of poor communication and 
coordination and confusion over mission assignments. Medical officers and volunteers 
had little information on deployment. Their bags were packed and ready to go for days 
with uncertainty about deployment. “While some medical teams waited, without 
equipment or supplies to care for patients, state and federal officials squabbled over 
reimbursement”.16 
Although both FEMA and DHHS made valiant efforts to activate federal 
emergency health resources and capabilities of the NDMS and the U.S. Public Health 
Services, only a limited number of federal medical teams were pre-deployed. Only one 
NDMS team was in that critical position to provide immediate medical attention in the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.17 DHHS struggled in its NRP role as coordinating agent 
for ESF #8 due to a lack of control over vital medical assets and independent activities of 
FEMA with the deployment of NDMS, a critical resource. The deployment of medical 
personnel overall was reactive, not proactive. 
However, as of September 9, 2005, post-Katrina, FEMA reported that it had 
deployed more than 87 NDMS teams in response to the hurricane. Of those 87, the entire 
nation’s 50 DMATs fanned out across the Gulf Coast working in austere conditions with 
limited resources. Many of the teams reported working under extreme fatigue with 
limited medical supplies, inadequate basic personal items such as food and water and 
                                                 
15 A Failure of Initiative, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response 
to Hurricane Katrina, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), 289-290. 
16 Ibid., 302. 
17 Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared Executive Summary, Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, (Washington, DC: n.p., May 2006), 7.  
12 
intermittent electricity.18 The other teams deployed were associated with the Disaster 
Mortuary Operational Response Teams (DMORTs), Veterinary Assistance Teams 
(VMATs) and National Pharmacy Response Teams. It is important to note that NDMS 
does receive routine funding through the Public Health Programs of DHS Preparedness 
and Response Title and was further augmented on September 8th when President Bush 
signed the second emergency supplemental appropriation for Katrina related response.19 
There continues to be concerns with these federal resources and the movement of the 
NDMS program between DHS and FEMA which may impact the ability of the federal 
agencies to orchestrate a pre-deployment adequately prior to an event.  
The Medical Reserve Corp maintains a medical volunteer database which can 
theoretically be activated within 24 hours. This database was used to verify some 
volunteer credentials and link those volunteers with pre-existing rescue teams on the 
ground.20 
The Federal Medical Shelters (FMS) were a new component to the DHHS 
response resource. These are 250 bed rapidly deployable units for housing, triage and 
maintaining stable, displaced patients. These were first deployed during Katrina and were 
used to augment hospitals in the Gulf with surge capacity. It has been suggested that this 
expensive resource was significantly under utilized during Katrina as only one was pre-
positioned, with the rest to follow during a chaotic time.21 
Early reports from Louisiana suggest that the public health system was able to 
immediately implement processes to support continuity of critical services, credited to 
some all hazard improvements made since 2001. This included diverting public health 
laboratory functions to regional laboratories outside the effected area and working to re-
route specimens appropriately.22 In addition local and state public health agencies were 
instrumental in providing vaccinations and other services to the responding communities.  
                                                 
18 A Failure of Initiative, 272. 
19 Domestic Social Policy Division, Hurricane Katrina: The Public Health and Medical Response 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005), CRS 12 – 15.  
20 A Failure of Initiative, 274. 
21 Ibid., 276. 
22 Domestic Social Policy Division, Hurricane Katrina, 16. 
13 
The experiences of New Orleans’ hospitals reinforce the need to better train and 
exercise this specific sector. Healthcare presents distinctive and different challenges in a 
community wide or catastrophic disaster. By its very nature, hospitals and health facilities 
house large concentrations of people who cannot manage their own evacuation or health 
status. Facility-specific and deployed resources were not adequate to meet this complex 
need.23 This storm demonstrated the need for greater integration and harmonization of 
preparedness efforts, not only among the federal agencies but State and Local 
governments and the private and non-profit sectors as well. Much can and should be 
brought to the table pre-event, such as planning, identification of resources including 
personnel that can augment the response during and post event. 24 
                                                 
23 Bradford Gray and Kathy Hebert, After Katrina Hospitals in Hurricane Katrina, ed. (Washington, 
DC: The Urban Institute, 2006), 14. 






























III. MUTUAL AID OPPORTUNITIES 
In an effort to understand the specific challenges for private, non-governmental 
health professionals, brief reviews of the current mechanisms for mutual aid that can be 
elicited during an incident are in order. The participation of the federal government in 
any disaster assistance efforts are governed by what is usually referred to as The Stafford 
Act. The Robert T. Stafford Act, as amended by Public Law 106-390 on October 30, 
2000, was intended to provide an orderly and continuing mechanism for assistance to 
state and local governments by the federal government in a disaster to expedite the 
rendering of aid, provision of assistance and the reconstruction and rehabilitation of 
specific devastated areas.25 All requests for assistance to the President must be from the 
Governor of the affected state. Information such as the nature and amount of state and 
local resources which have been or will be committed to and preliminary estimates of 
supplemental federal disaster assistance must be included in the request. Funds are then 
allocated from the Disaster Relief Fund appropriated for that particular year. The Stafford 
Act focuses on joint responsibility for the effected agencies, governing bodies and the 
federal government.26 In addition, this Act permits the federal government to “accept and 
utilize” the services of any state or local government with their consent.27 
In August 1999, FEMA published 9525.4 Medical Care and Evacuations, a 
section specific to offering aid to publicly owned and private non-profit facilities. Private 
for-profit organizations are not eligible applicants for public assistance grant funds for 
either emergency medical treatment facilities or for evacuations. This section directs 
reimbursement when medical facilities in a disaster area experience increased patient 
loads and operating costs; FEMA does not generally reimburse healthcare facilities for 
those increased costs. However, FEMA will fund some emergency costs associated with 
providing additional facilities for emergency services in catastrophic disasters. This may 
include temporary tents or portable buildings for treatment of disaster victims, leased 
                                                 
25 Federal Emergency Management Agency, (accessed June 27, 2005). 
26 Keith Bea, Federal Stafford Act Disaster Assistance: Presidential Declarations, Eligible Activities, 
and Funding (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006), CRS, 1-2. 
27 Hospital Emergency Assistance Act of 2005, S.1393, 1st Session, 109th Congress, (July 13, 2005). 
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equipment and security for the temporary facilities. However, that which is not covered 
are those areas most likely to cripple health facilities such as emergency medical 
treatment of any kind, follow-up care of disaster victims, increased administrative and 
operational costs to the hospital due to increased patient load and costs associated with 
loss of revenue. Finally, some costs associated with evacuation and transporting may be 
eligible under this section. Specific personnel costs are defined as overtime for regular 
full time and extra hires to evacuate and assist in transportation of patients from the 
damaged facilities. Ineligible costs relate to any and all medical staff for transport and 
medications use associated with the transport process.28 
In July, a bill was introduced into the Senate to amend the Stafford Act called the 
“Hospital Emergency Assistance Act of 2005”. This amendment would provide a 
mechanism for reimbursement to certain for-profit hospitals. This proposed revision 
occurred after review of the 2004 Florida hurricane season, focusing on hospital 
damages. This puts for-profit hospitals in the same reimbursement category as non-profit 
facilities for potential federal relief assistance. It contains the provision that damage 
occurred during the declared major disaster and the for-profit hospital acted in 
accordance with all requirements of governmental or non-profit health facilities 
responding to the event. This is critical as the for-profit health facility may be the only 
access to care for a specific jurisdiction, their inability to reopen due to damage and 
financial crippling would impact both in the short and long term an entire community. 29 
The bill was referred from the Senate to the house as H.R.3714 on September 8, 2005 and 
unfortunately as of this date remains in subcommittee status.30 The inability to include 
for-profit hospitals into the planning and response activities could significantly negatively 
impact jurisdictions that may only have for-profit hospitals as their points of service 
during emergencies. Their reluctance to participate in a disaster could be based on their 
inability to receive reimbursement. 
                                                 
28 FEMA Public Assistance, “9525.4 Medical Care and Evacuations”, Available [online] 
http://www.fema.gov/rrr/pa/9525_4.shtm (accessed June 17, 2005). 
29 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. 
30 THOMAS, Library of Congress. Available [online} http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/z?c109:H.R.3714 (accessed September 4, 2006). 
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Specific private organizations often have both formal and informal mutual aid 
agreements. These can be as sophisticated as a signed document that addresses legal, 
technical and procedural issues related to the sharing of personnel, equipment and other 
needed resources during an emergency. It could also be as simple as a handshake 
agreement between two Chief Executive Officers. The concern is that a less formal 
agreement may not address key issues such as liability and compensation or are not 
inclusive and lack robustness.31 Either of these have the same intention, to serve the 
facility when their resources have been stressed and exhausted, thus needing assistance. 
Regardless of potential governmental mutual aid that may be available, efforts continue 
via the DHS, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the HRSA 
preparedness grants to encourage individual disciplines and agencies to establish mutual 
aid agreements. Each individual agency should bear that responsibility for their 
respective organization or system. This would include addressing the critical issues of 
reimbursement for expenses, insurance, malpractice, and liability protection for medical 
personnel, workers compensation, death benefits and verification of licensure where 
appropriate. 
Many states across the country also have state specific governmental mutual aid 
compacts. The MEMAC is the State of Michigan public sector mutual aid compact. It is 
intended to facilitate a comprehensive and coordinated response to a major or widespread 
threat or catastrophic event in which a local and gubernatorial declaration of a state of 
emergency is anticipated or already issued. It is designed specifically for governmental 
entities such as counties, municipalities, townships, political subdivisions and interlocal 
public agencies.32 It was officially put into effect with the signature of the Governor in 
early 2006. In order for an individual governmental agency to sign onto MEMAC, all 
governmental agencies within that municipality must agree to sign on. Therefore, a public 
health agency cannot sign on if the local law enforcement chooses not to do so. This 
requires coordination amongst all governmental agencies within one jurisdiction to agree 
                                                 
31 National Emergency Management Association , http://www.nemaweb.org (accessed August 21. 
2006).  
32 K. Krzanowski, D. Chrysler, and K. Mark, Mutual Aid: Unity of Purpose, Information and 
Resources, An Issue Brief for State and Local Public Health Policy Makers (Lansing, MI., December 
2004), 7. 
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that MEMAC is a benefit for their agencies. As with most mutual aid agreements, an 
authorized individual must have signed the document pre-event or it will not be honored 
should a jurisdiction attempt to sign on once an incident has occurred. The MEMAC was 
designated as an “opt in” compact which means governmental agencies must specifically 
sign on to be included in the compact. Current efforts are underway to get statewide 
signatory of all governmental jurisdictions within Michigan. However, it should be 
reinforced that MEMAC is for governmental agencies only and does not include private, 
non-governmental agencies including medical health. 
Some states have established their statewide mutual aid compacts as “opt out” 
such as Missouri and Ohio. All governmental agencies are automatically included in the 
compact unless they specifically decline inclusion in writing. This methodology utilizes 
the path of least resistance for most governmental agencies and tends to promote the 
majority of governmental agencies participation in the statewide mutual aid compact. 
This decreases the workload to elicit signatories and proves beneficial once an event 
occurs. 
Finally, the critical mutual aid compact that has the most impact for all states is 
the Emergency Management Assistance Compact. The EMAC was passed by Congress 
in 1996 and carried specific language that necessitates state legislative approval to join.33 
The EMAC offers state to state assistance during governor declared emergencies. As of 
May 2006 when Hawaii signed onto EMAC, all 50 states, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin 
Islands have enacted state legislation to become members of EMAC.34 Administration of 
EMAC is by the National Emergency Management Association, EMAC Operations 
Committee. This committee is made up of representatives from each member state and 
meets at least bi-yearly. A smaller representative EMAC Executive Committee meets 
more frequently and ensures that EMAC is in a constant state of readiness and can flex to 
meet the ongoing needs of the member states. 
                                                 
33 National Emergency Management Association, Emergency Management Assistance Compact, 
Guidebook & Operating Procedures (Washington, DC, 2003), A-1. 
34 National Emergency Management Association, "Hawaii Joins Emergency Management Assistance 
Compact," NEMA, 2006, Available [online] http://www.nemaweb.org, (accessed June 06, 2006). 
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There are specific benefits that EMAC offers and includes: a quick response to 
disasters using human resources and expertise of member states, state to state 
standardized process assistance during a Governor declared state of emergency to deploy 
resources, a legal foundation with terms that constitute a legal binding contractual 
agreement outlining responsibility for reimbursement by the affected not sending states, 
solves the problems of liability protection, workers compensation and death benefits, 
credential and licensure validation across state lines and finally it can move resources 
other compacts cannot such as medical resources, with the correct processes in place. 35  
The legal issues are the primary reason that a state must enact legislation for 
participation in EMAC. Key articles of EMAC include Article V which recognizes a 
license, certificate, or other permit issued by any compact state as valid in the receiving 
state when requested to provide assistance to render aid necessary to meet the needs of 
the disaster. Article VI affirm officers or employees of a state shall be considered agents 
of the requesting state for tort liability and immunity purposes and thus shall not be liable 
on account of any act of omission in good faith. It should be noted that good faith does 
not include willful misconduct, gross negligence or reckless behavior. Article VIII 
defines that the state shall provide for the payment of compensation and death benefits to 
injured members of the emergency forces of that state and representatives of deceased 
members who sustain injuries or are killed while rendering aid to this compact. The key 
point is that the payment comes from the assisting or home state as if the injury or death 
were sustained within their own state. Reimbursement issues are covered in Article IX 
noting that any state rendering aid in another state as part of EMAC shall be reimbursed 
by the state receiving aid for any loss or damage to or expenses occurred during that 
deployment. The reimbursement process is well defined and timelines including the 
method to establish a pre-estimate of costs for the anticipated services prior to 
deployment.36 It cannot be over emphasized that EMAC is for governmental agencies 
only. A sending state can deploy private resources provided they have the ability either 
through enacted legislation or a gubernatorial executive order to make private entities 
                                                 
35 National Emergency Management Association, "Hawaii Joins Emergency Management Assistance 
Compact.” 
36 National Emergency Management Association, Emergency Management Assistance Compact, 
Guidebook & Operating Procedures, A-5, 6–8. 
20 
“agents of the state” for the purposes of deployment through EMAC. Doing that provides 
all the above noted protections to anyone deployed. 
EMAC was a success during the Hurricane Katrina response with a total of 1,403 
requests for assistance processed and 46,288 personnel deployments for an estimated cost 
of $515.9 million. Personnel included: firefighters, search and rescue personnel, 
HAZMAT personnel, emergency medical technicians, law enforcement, fish and wildlife 
personnel and inspectors, corrections, airport maintenance, ambulances, medical doctors, 
registered nurses and National Guard troops.37 
Louisiana and Mississippi relied heavily on EMAC, which provided the system 
for sharing National Guard troops and other resources. It was noted that the magnitude of 
the demands did strain the EMAC process and identified limitations in the system for 
future improvements. This included the mechanisms for processing the volume of 
incoming resources.38 
Although the focus of this paper is on Incidents of National Significance or 
catastrophic events in which a Governor and or the President would declare a state of 
emergency and thus initiate specific activities including EMAC and federal support; 
additional challenges do exist in the ability of states to share assets and personnel quickly 
and effectively during events that are not declared emergencies. Beyond the scope of this 
thesis are the significant legal challenges that need to be addressed in the development of 
mutual aid agreements for non-catastrophic emergencies which could be specific to 
healthcare. There is a need for further study and recommendations on this specific 
issue.39 
                                                 
37 A Failure of Initiative, 250. 
38 Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared Executive Summary, 11. 
39 Chris Logan, Beyond EMAC: Legal Issues in Mutual Aid Agreements for Public Health Practice 
(Washington, DC: NGA Center for Best Practices). 
21 
IV. RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA SURVEY 
After action reports and new information on the issues associated with Hurricane 
Katrina continues to be published and will be a source of study in the future. However, it 
was important to gather targeted information that focused on the medical health aspects 
of the response. In order to do that a survey tool was developed to gather information 
from each of the states except Louisiana due to obvious impact. Six questions were 
focused on the issues associated with mutual aid mechanisms to deploy private, non-
governmental health professionals. In addition, each state could indicate their interest in 
receiving the cumulative report of the findings at the completion of this project. 
A requirement of the DHHS National Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness 
Program (NBHPP) is the designation within each state of a Bioterrorism Hospital 
Coordinator. This individual routinely works with their respective health organizations 
and professionals as well as their state emergency operation center on activities 
associated with Emergency Support Function #8. The assumption was that this individual 
in each state would have access to the information and knowledge necessary to accurately 
complete the survey.  
The survey tool was emailed to each state’s Bioterrorism Hospital Coordinator 
with a stated return deadline. Two additional emails and/or hard copies, if requested, 
were sent to those states that did not respond within the established deadline. In addition, 
in May 2006 a national conference of the NBHPP Bioterrorism Hospital Coordinators 
was held in Washington, DC. The survey tool was available in electronic and hard copy 
for completion by any state that wished to complete it during that meeting. This provided 
an opportunity for the researcher to personally approach those states that had failed to 
complete the survey and presented an opportunity for specific questions to be answered, 





A total of 39 states responded with completed surveys out of the 49 sent for a 
return rate of 80%. This return rate demonstrates solid validity of the data since a 
statistical survey is considered to be valid when a response rate of approximately 60 
percent is returned.40 
A question by question response summary can be located in Appendix A and 
contains detailed information on each item. The following is a summary of the important 
information attained. 
A. NATIONAL IMPACT 
 The survey validates that although the hurricanes catastrophically 
impacted the states of Mississippi, Alabama and Louisiana, the majority of the country 
felt the effects in varying degrees. Noting that this survey only asked questions related to 
the state governments’ involvement in healthcare personnel support of Katrina, one might 
suppose that every state was impacted. Of the 39 reporting states, only nine stated they 
were not involved in mutual aid requests for health personnel. Seven state did deploy 
health professionals, two of those seven did have health professionals deployed through 
mechanisms outside of the state structure oversight. One western state indicated that one 
of their large hospital systems did work directly with DHHS and the American Hospital 
Association (AHA) initiative to deploy a team of health professionals to New Orleans. 
An eastern seaboard state noted they were aware of an EMS provider that self-deployed 
and another was contracted directly through FEMA. 
B. MUTUAL AID REQUEST PROCESS 
The survey clearly indicated that multiple request and processing methods were 
used to manage the requests within each of the states. The majority of states, 30 out of 39, 
used the state to state mutual aid process of the EMAC. This high number indicates that 
the majority of states were using the national EMAC process to identify potential 
resources whether or not they were actually deployed. 
The second highest response for the requesting process focused on private 
industry compacts or mutual aid agreements. The most common example would be a 
national healthcare system that has facilities in other states. The corporate office made 
                                                 
40 Track Marketing Group, “Frequently Asked Questions,” Available [online] 
http://www.takesurvey.com/responserate.htm (accessed August 14, 2006). 
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arrangements with hospitals in non-affected areas. This occurred, for example in 
Michigan. The sending healthcare facility worked directly with the effected hospital in 
Louisiana. The corporate office served as the clearing house for mechanisms to support 
this process. In this way, the affected facility could identify the specific personnel and 
resources needed and worked to mobilize them expeditiously. Issues like personnel 
compensation, workers compensation and death benefits were not a concern since the 
employees were still working for their same corporation, just in a different location. 
Intra-state mechanisms proved useful within impacted states like Alabama that 
worked through established mutual aid agreements to mobilize in state resources to 
hospitals on the Gulf coast that were affected. This was facilitated by their Department of 
Health. It was evident in the survey that other states used this mechanism to assist with 
FEMA deployments, and self deployed evacuees into their state, including management 
of medical and public health needs. The establishment and expansion of intra-state 
mutual aid agreements between private healthcare entities continues to be a focus of the 
DHHS NBHPP preparedness initiative, well underway across the country. 
The third response mechanism fell into the “other” category and often noted 
initiatives associated with non-governmental volunteer organizations such as the local 
American Red Cross and faith-based organizations which deployed resources based on 
communications outside of the State Emergency Management structure of EMAC 
process. 
State and local jurisdictional compacts were tied as the last mechanism utilized to 
deploy resources. This is where states identified the utilization of their established 
Medical Reserve Corp staff, which in some states was integrated into their state-based 
Emergency System for Advance Registration-Volunteer Health Professionals process. 
Finally this mechanism was most often cited when deploying or utilizing governmental 
health resources for volunteers responding within the state specific response. It should be 
noted that this response focused on the care of evacuees that presented to bordering and 
destination states versus actual deployment out of their state. 
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C. HEALTH RESOURCES MOBILIZED OUTSIDE OF GOVERNMENTAL 
STRUCTURES AND IMPACT 
The genesis of this survey question came directly from an experience in Michigan 
during the Katrina response. One of the largest private EMS agencies in one of the 
emergency preparedness regions deployed after being contacted by the American 
Ambulance Association with a need for their services in New Orleans. This occurred 
directly between the two organizations. That is an acceptable practice and the needs for 
EMS resources were clearly demonstrated. However, this deployment left this particular 
region without sufficient coverage for routine EMS calls over a holiday weekend. 
Because this occurred outside of the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) or 
Community Health Emergency Coordinating Center (CHECC) knowledge, neighboring 
jurisdictional mutual aid had to be enacted to provide services within Michigan.  
For those states surveyed that answered this question, 19 out of 39 or 48% 
indicated a similar activity of resource deployment outside the state emergency operation 
center’s awareness. Sometimes this was done by other federal or volunteer organizations 
but the issues of self-deployment clearly augmented this problem. Several states indicated 
the attempts to self-deploy by partners but an intervention ceased that activity. In 
addition, comments were provided that indicated this as a burden on their states’ health 
resources, especially for those rural states experiencing diminished health resources as a 
routine practice. This was most often cited in response to EMS resources.  
D. LIABILITY PROTECTION ISSUES 
The issues of liability protection appear to pose the least amount of challenge 
when addressing volunteer health professionals. Most states indicated that there were 
mechanisms to protect their health volunteers, with ten states indicating the protection 
would be the same as for state governmental employees. A disclaimer noted that the 
volunteer must be working within the established state structure, under either 
gubernatorial or Presidential declared emergency or specific state enacted statutes. Two 
states indicated there was no process and three noted they were currently working to 
resolve this specific issue. Many noted that their current NBHPP preparedness initiative 
to establish their state based ESAR-VHP program, had laid adequate ground work for 
discussion and investigation of the liability issues.  
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E. WORKERS COMPENSATION ISSUES 
The issues associated with workers compensation become more complex and 
challenging with many states unsure of the level of protection for volunteer health 
professionals. The same ten states as noted in liability protection stated their volunteers 
would be covered by state level workers compensation if deployed for a state or national 
declared emergency. However, eight states noted there was no process to protect their 
volunteers and four were working on a method at the time of the survey. One state 
indicated they purchased specific workers compensation policy during Katrina listing the 
names of the individuals deployed from that state. This was not mentioned by any other 
survey participant. 
Interestingly, four states indicated the workers compensation would be covered 
under EMAC, but it is unclear if the writer understood that the EMAC process utilizes the 
sending states workers compensation and other benefits by making those deployed 
“agents of the state”. Of particular concern is the one state that indicated the coverage 
would be provided by the “parent employer” but it was unclear if that had been validated 
or assumed because additional information was not provided.  
F. DEATH COMPENSATION ISSUES 
This question appeared to hold the most uncertainty by those that completed the 
survey: 11 noted no process, three did not know, and three are working on this critical 
issue. Only six states indicated that volunteer health professionals would be covered if 
deployed as “agents of the state” and one state covers those who participate in a pre-
identified response team. Again, four states felt that those deployed would receive 
benefits under EMAC. 
G. ENACTMENT OF ANY EXECUTIVE ORDERS SPECIFIC TO PRIVATE 
NON-GOVERNMENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 
Of the 39 surveys, 25 or 64% indicated their governmental agencies did not need 
to enact any type of executive order specific to activities associated with the deployment 
of private, non-governmental health professionals. Three states stated they did not know 
if this occurred and four indicated a specific executive order was enacted by their 
Governor. All of the four specifically cited the need to make specific health professionals 
“agents of the state” and support activities necessary for deployment to Katrina effected 
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areas. In addition, one mid-western state executive order empowered the deployment of 
one or more mobile support units and provided general funds to support resources 
necessary. 
H. UNANTICIPATED FINDINGS FROM SURVEY 
A positive outcome of Hurricane Katrina and the survey was an increased 
awareness by state level Bioterrorism Hospital Coordinators of the traditional emergency 
management process utilized during an emergency. Most specifically, issues associate 
with EMAC and other mutual aid processes. It was evident that a significant number of 
coordinators are unclear as to what exactly EMAC does and does not cover, including 
issues of financial compensation, workers compensation and death benefits. These is 
particularly disturbing as Bioterrorism Hospital Coordinators, representatives of state 
government, deal directly with health disciplines and must be knowledgeable of 
processes to advocate inclusion into traditional public safety and Homeland Security 
initiatives. One mid-west Bioterrorism Hospital Coordinator confided in the survey 
author a total misunderstanding of the process and a concern that their program deployed 
40-50 health practitioners without adequate coverage, simply because of a lack of 
understanding of the process. 
In Michigan, during the Katrina response, the EMS providers verbally challenged 
the need for state level awareness of those deployed outside the SEOC process. Agencies 
that were directly deployed by FEMA or another national organization did not feel it a 
concern of the state. However, their deployment impacted services within geographic 
areas of Michigan, forcing the enactment of local mutual aid compacts to cover critical 
services within Michigan. This situation demonstrated the “need to know” by both local 
and state emergency management agencies so that overall coverage is insured. This 
demonstrates the need for clear education and instruction to all first responders on issues 
of deployment, volunteerism and the level of protection. 
In addition, several comments on the completed surveys demonstrated that the 
Bioterrorism Hospital Coordinators had the mechanisms to identify volunteers but the 
challenges and resultant inability to actually deploy them were significant. This 
frustration was noted in the actual survey completed but also in personal conversation 
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between the survey author and other HRSA state level coordinators at National meetings 
and on Katrina related conference calls. 
Finally, this author was surprised that few surveys mentioned the actual 
deployment of volunteer health professionals via the DHHS and AHA web site. Most 
mentioned the gathering of names and data but the absence of solid deployment numbers. 
As noted, over 33,000 health professionals registered on the site but just over 3000 
actually were deployed. The information obtained indicated a great deal of challenges 
existed at the federal level in completing the validation of licensure and credentials 
necessary in a timely basis to support deployment when needed.41 This lack of 
information would lend itself to further investigation and study of those who were 
successfully deployed through this mechanism. 
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V. VOLUNTEER HEALTH PROFESSIONAL ISSUES 
Despite the noted medical resources that were deployed through the NDMS, early 
reports indicated that triage centers, hospitals and field hospitals were overwhelmed and 
requesting more personnel. On September 3, DHHS initiated activities to identify 
volunteer health professionals to deploy to affected areas. Within the Public Health 
Service Act, 42 U.S.C 312, there is a provision that authorizes the Secretary of DHHS to 
augment emergency response personnel by deploying them as intermittent disaster 
response personnel as a member of the NDMS. In addition, there were efforts to identify 
a mechanism to deploy them as temporary unpaid federal employees. This process is 
described further in the strategic plan of this document but suffice to say, by September 
19, 2005, the call for additional persons had been rescinded and the actual number of 
individuals deployed and mechanisms to protect them are still unclear.42 
Many after action reports reference the HRSA ESAR-VHP program. This 
program initiated in 2005, is designed to assist local, state and federal planning initiatives 
and includes national authorities in identifying and verifying the status of volunteer 
health professionals. Each state will develop the database based on national standards that 
as of September 2006 have not been finalized by HRSA. These standards will include 
verification of license and credentials. The ESAR-VHP program has contracted with The 
Center for Law and the Public’s Health at Georgetown and John Hopkins Universities. 
They assisted real time during Katrina to provide consultation and guidelines to assist in 
the complicated processes of deploying private, non-governmental employees and 
continue to publish materials on their web site regularly.43 
Overall, DHHS was successful in mobilizing and credentialing a relatively small 
number of health professionals to Hurricane Katrina areas. Most of this was due to the 
assistance of private companies, like Kaiser Permanente who processed over 3,400 
                                                 
42 Domestic Social Policy Division, Hurricane Katrina: The Public Health and Medical Response, 
20–21. 
43 "Emergency System for Advance Registration of Volunteer Health Professionals," HRSA, 2006, 
Available [online], http://hrsa.gov/esarvhp/legregissues/default.htm (accessed August 22, 2006). 
30 
volunteers and actually deployed over 1,000 persons.44 Unfortunately, this detailed 
information is not yet available to validate the impact both financial and psychological 
this deployment has had on this organization. Efforts to pursue this information continue.  
Finally, two state systems were able to respond to the request for help due to pre-
event planning, training and exercising under previous Bioterrorism preparedness 
initiatives. The South Carolina MED-1 is a self-contained emergency and operating room 
mobile hospital with 100 hospital beds and all necessary resources. The MED-1 was 
federalized, deployed, and staffed by a team of volunteers from the Carolina Medical 
Center, Public Health Service and other medical volunteers. This unit treated almost 
5,000 patients and is considered one of the true success stories of the overall medical 
response.45 
On September 2, 2005, the state of Nevada received an email requesting the 
transport of its mobile medical facility (NV-1) to the New Orleans Airport. It had been 
federalized to assist at the airport. However, upon arrival, they were informed this asset 
was no longer needed and eventually this excellent resource was routed to Gulfport, MS. 
The delay in initial deployment of this resource was blamed on confusion of need and 
previous deployment requests. Once again, this resource was staffed by volunteer health 
professionals, the Nevada Hospital Association and Public Health Service Officers. In 
total, NV-1 saw almost 500 patients by the end of September, reinforcing the value of the 
established state-based mobile facility and accompanying resources.46 
It must be stressed that thousands of lives were saved, a tribute to the medical 
professionals and volunteers who worked tirelessly in austere health conditions. Yet, 
information continues to demonstrate that the lack of planning not a lack of effort 
contributed to problems that hindered further success. There were not nearly enough 
medical personnel teams in position prior to landfall and a lack of mechanisms to 
mobilize the volunteers the federal government requested, leaving many feeling 
disappointed and unimportant. 
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45 Ibid., 277. 
46 Ibid. 
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VI VOLUNTEERISM PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The ability to mobilize those that stood ready to deploy could have lasting effects 
on the identification and willingness of this discipline to volunteer in the future. A review 
of issues associated with volunteerism could assist in postulating the potential impact 
thwarting volunteerism during the response to Hurricane Katrina and the effects it may 
have on current and future Homeland Security initiatives. This is an important point of 
consideration in reviewing all mechanisms to support an integrated response to public 
health or mass casualty emergencies. 
Volunteerism has been a staple of American societies for years. Each year the 
American Red Cross mobilizes relief to victims impacted by more than 60,000 disasters 
nationwide, a record 72,883 in 2005.47 This is in addition to one of their main directives 
of over 50 years to provide the largest supply of blood and blood products in the United 
States. Activities associated with volunteerism are synonymous with the words 
“American Red Cross” as they boast of training over 11 million people in life-saving 
skills, provide direct health services to 1.8 million people, contribute over 22 million 
locally relevant community service activities, expand services to aid in international 
disasters in more than 50 countries, and continue their mission to transmit emergency 
messages between members of the United States Armed Forces and their families. 
Certainly the breadth of these activities would necessitate a substantial infrastructure. 
However, in Fiscal Year 2002, ninety-seven percent of American Red Cross staff is 
volunteers, over 1.2 million people.48 
Other volunteer organizations boast similar statistics for services provided. The 
Volunteers of America, formed in 1896, help nearly two million people in over 400 
communities through thousands of human service programs that are coordinated by 39 
offices within 44 states. In 2005, this national, nonprofit faith-based organization utilized 
the services of 95,000 volunteers to continue their mission to help those in need to rebuild 
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their life through various housing, healthcare, and human service support activities.49 
These organizations demonstrate the depth of established organizations at a national level 
but literally thousands of smaller, community-based volunteer organizations exist across 
the country and bridge a critical gap for local, state and federal agencies in services they 
provide. 
Volunteer service organizations must constantly recruit volunteers, identify 
mechanisms to maintain communications and promote satisfying experiences during 
actual volunteer commitments. This must all occur while fostering methods to seek and 
maintain enduring commitments from their volunteer force. Recognizing the diverse 
make up of volunteers, strategies for matching their skill and individual motivational 
goals, with the right volunteer opportunity, are critical to ensure durable success. People 
wish to contribute efforts to impact or affect some of the major problems facing society 
often through volunteerism: violence, hunger, homelessness and illiteracy. This 
volunteerism allows people to help people, and at the same time, address some of 
societies’ more global issues.50  
There are reasons why individuals volunteer. At first glance, it may seem that acts 
of volunteerism are similar when in fact the motivational processes behind individual 
volunteerism may be quite different. A study by E. Gil Clary and colleagues 
hypothesized six functions potentially served by volunteerism and designed multiple 
studies to test these theories. The first function is the recognition that the act of 
volunteerism allows an individual to express humanistic concern for others. Second is the 
opportunity for the volunteer to learn new skills while utilizing their current knowledge 
and skills was also very important. Third is being part of a social group and engaging in 
activities seen as important to others. Fourth is the potential to improve a current or future 
career opportunity. Fifth is the reduction of guilt feelings by the volunteer of being more 
fortunate, often predicating them to assist those who are less fortunate. Finally, the sixth 
is the personal satisfaction or ego boost derived from participating in a volunteer activity. 
All of the noted issues ultimately provide a positive, personal reward and increased 
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satisfaction and self-esteem for the actual volunteer.51 It is clear that people offer to 
volunteer with needs and motives important to them. However, the volunteer activity may 
or may not fulfill those needs. It is important to meld the persons and the situations in a 
manner that creates sustained helpfulness of volunteerism.52 
A recent “need” to volunteer has been expressed to and by high school and 
college students. More and more high schools and universities are requiring or giving 
academic credit to individuals engaged in approved volunteer activities. Once the student 
successfully completes the volunteer requirements and has achieved the desired outcome, 
admission to college, the experience gained through that volunteer activity could impact 
continued or future volunteer activities. In addition, students engaging in volunteerism 
gain an understanding of potentially related occupations and careers to obtain real world 
experience. Clearly these students have invaluable skills in obtaining a job compared to 
one who has not volunteered.53 A study by Clary et al., demonstrated that volunteers, 
who received benefits relevant to their primary volunteer motivational focus, were not 
only more satisfied with their service but also intended to continue these actions in both 
the short and long-term future.54 This was validated by a recent news report that avows 
many college students, shaped by recent events of September 11, 2001 and Hurricane 
Katrina are applying to service organizations in record numbers. Individuals in their early 
20’s feel that channeling their activism into helping others provides them the opportunity 
for “service-learning”, helping others while helping themselves.55 
Individuals like to “belong”; this belonging often includes participating in a social 
structure. Volunteerism can provide that social structure. Volunteers that become part of 
a group adapt together to provide fellow member support and offer to protect each other, 
share resources, pool valuable information and ultimately contribute to the greater good. 
Denial of that opportunity can have an impact. A study by Baumeister et al. looked at the 
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effect of social exclusion on cognitive processes and concluded that the anticipated 
aloneness or the inability to be part of a group did reduce intelligent thought and seemed 
to put the mood of those excluded into a neutral state. This mood also appeared to 
demonstrate an active effort to suppress their overall emotion.56  Thus, one might 
conclude that socially isolating a highly sought after professional, such as a physician or 
nurse could decrease their desire to be engaged. The suppression of their emotional 
response to future events or the neutralization of their need to think through and become 
engaged may impact their desire and ultimate action in the future.  
Individuals wishing to volunteer may not be allowed to do so. As mentioned, 
volunteering adds social roles to ones life, and therefore should yield mental health 
benefits. But the inability to fulfill or lose this social role affects psychological distress in 
both men and women.57 During Hurricane Katrina, early news reports highlighted the 
impact the hurricane had on the current medical infrastructure. News reels ran 24/7 
showing patients on roofs of hospitals awaiting helicopter evacuation. Almost 
concurrently, states across the country were standing up their state emergency operation 
centers anticipating that this Incident of National Significance would impact areas far 
beyond those directly hit by the storm. Communications expressed the need for health 
professionals from affected states through mutual aid agreements processes such as the 
federally established EMAC. When this occurred many states utilized their DHHS HRSA 
National Bioterrorism Preparedness Program state level point of contact to communicate 
the need for physicians, nurses, nurse aides and Emergency Medical Services personnel 
to stakeholders statewide. This included gathering the required volunteer demographic 
information and communicating the information on deployment conditions to those 
interested in volunteering, thus assisting in their decision-making process to volunteer or 
decline. All states recognized the importance of gathering this information expeditiously 
and efficiently due to the critical nature that existed, most notably in Louisiana. This 
urgency led aggressive activities in states across the nation.  
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Concurrently, other federal departments were seeking medical and health 
volunteers through other mechanisms, including directly contacting national 
organizations such as the American Ambulance Association, American Hospital 
Association and the American Nurses Association. The DHHS also established a web 
site58 where health professionals interesting in volunteering for deployment could 
register, indicating their availability, special skills, and expertise. This caused confusion 
for health professionals due to multiple disparate messaging and thus many registered 
with their state structure as well as the national DHHS website, duplicate information. It 
should be noted that as of May 2006 more than 33,000 health professionals and relief 
personnel registered on the DHHS site but fewer than 3,000 of them were ever contacted 
for deployment.59 The number of individuals that registered on this site may stem from 
the partnership DHHS established with the American Hospital Association during 
Katrina. The AHA agreed to set up an emergency conference call with hospital chief 
executive officials across the country to discuss registration of their staff to volunteer on 
the DHHS website. Most state governmental agencies were unaware of the first and 
subsequent calls, unless they had a close partnership with their state hospital association. 
Fortunately, this was the case in Michigan. The state government officials and a member 
of the Michigan Health and Hospital Association (MHA) joined calls together almost 
everyday at the beginning of the Hurricane Katrina response. One could infer that the 
support of the DHHS web registration site, by national and state level hospital 
associations, contributed to the large number of registrants. Studies conducted to engage 
the appropriate functions to persuade volunteers, (in this case the persuasive strategy to 
enlist chief executive officials of hospitals, a consumer of volunteer services) may have 
contributed to the psychological motivation of people to action, that being registration on 
the site.60 
For example, the Michigan NBHPP Bioterrorism Hospital Coordinator continued 
to gather names of individuals wishing to volunteer, per the EMAC requests, including 
contacting discipline-specific Michigan employers to ensure that their agency agreed to 
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allow the individual time off without compromising their current operations. As this 
process unfolded eventually for weeks, individuals and groups of health professionals 
began to express anger at state offices for the delay in deployment. The health 
coordinating center as well as the SEOC was flooded with incoming communications 
indicating that persons were ready to deploy and individual physicians in some of the 
rural Michigan areas had cancelled their patients for two weeks in anticipation of 
imminent deployment despite any directives to do so. Health professionals became 
angered and could not understand why the process was not working and expressed many 
emotions, most of which were not supportive of the perceived governmental processes to 
provide aid to the affected areas. 
Most importantly health professionals began to deploy on their own due to a lack 
of coordination for this discipline and when they perceived a critical need for their 
services as demonstrated by the media and national professional organization 
communications to their members. Those that self-deployed were often rejected upon 
arrival to the affected area, due to a lack of verified credentials, and the inability to house, 
feed or train those that “just showed up”. These “spontaneous volunteers” created 
significant challenges for the incident command structure in the Katrina affected areas. 
This further fueled the challenges and unrest of those that wished to volunteer, those who 
could not, and those that did and were turned away. The EMS personnel that self 
deployed returned to Michigan frustrated as the need for their skills and services was 
present, but the structure to implement it did not exist. 
An advanced certified emergency nurse, called to express her anger with the 
process stating, “I have so many skills to offer and would be there in hours if someone 
would just help me get there. This is really not right”!61 It appeared that she, as well as 
thousands of health professionals, felt “rejected” since they did not fit into any 
established mutual aid structure. Their status of being private, non-governmental health 
professionals and their lack of definitive access to protections similar to those deployed 
under the current EMAC structure, kept them from being safely deployed.  Studies have 
shown that rejection of any form registers specifically in the brain, in the same manner as 
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physical pain. People who are rejected are less likely to adapt behaviors to fit into 
society.62 Again, this social distancing by not deploying one responder, namely health 
professionals, but mobilizing others such as local law enforcement, creates a measurable 
“painful response” that can and seems to still have long-term implications. As a 
governmental emergency planner, the issue of physicians and nurses “not fitting” is the 
most often asked question when visiting a hospital or EMS agency. This is exacerbated 
when the continued focus is to engage private health entities to partners with local, state, 
and federal government on issues of integrating emergency response plans such as the 
National Response Plan. 
The hurricane season starts, one year post Katrina, and the processes described are 
unchanged. The good news is that dialogue is occurring at the local, state, and federal 
levels on methods to better utilize and protect private health volunteers during an Incident 
of National Significance. However, the mechanisms have not changed nationwide. 
In Michigan, the milieu of volunteerism has gained new momentum. In January 
2006, Michigan launched a system called the MI Volunteer Registry available at 
www.MIVolunteerRegistry.com. This state-based system is designed to merge with the 
DHHS ESAR-VHP programs, currently under development in states across the country. 
The most common question asked, in conjunction with the registry, relates to the issues 
identified during the non-deployment period of Katrina: workers compensation, death 
benefits and the ability to integrate into the established emergency management processes 
including EMAC. 
Healthcare professionals spend their entire career serving others. The act of 
volunteering augments that focus by helping others without receiving financial 
compensation fosters trust and intimacy between other like professionals, increases the 
subjective well-being by taking steps to make a difference, and reinforces a concept that 
reciprocal help will be forthcoming when needed. All of this supports a sense of control 
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over one’s life and environment, which meets a basic psychological need and decreases 
the physical and psychological association of despair, exclusion and social isolation.63 
In conclusion, reviews of the above functional, personal and social motivations 
that support volunteerism promote sustained helping behavior. Satisfied volunteers meet 
their own psychological needs and identify the importance of continued volunteerism. 
This author would surmise, based on the research reviewed and communications with 
healthcare professionals that were unable to volunteer, that negative attitudes and feelings 
of social isolation and diminished importance in the traditional public safety response 
process resulted from the challenges experienced during Hurricane Katrina. As Michigan 
continues to seek health volunteers for their registry, mechanisms to provide inclusion 
versus exclusion must be designed, implemented, and reinforced by appropriate 
messaging, and incorporating these concepts into local, regional and state on a regular 
basis. It will be critical for overall Homeland Security initiatives that this occurs across 
our country. In addition, the deployment issues of Hurricane Katrina could provide a rich 
database of issues and subject for further research. Each of the 33,000 health 
professionals who volunteered on the DHHS web-site could be queried on a significant 
number of issues that could shed important light onto the short and long-term 
psychological effect of non-deployment. Questions directed at future intent for 
volunteerism and perceptions of governmental processes may provide useful insight to 
future strategies. 
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VII. STRATEGIC PLANNING TO FACILITATE 
IMPLEMENTATION 
A. FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE OF ESTABLISHING MECHANISM 
Hurricane Katrina presented multiple challenges for local, state and federal 
agencies. Early in the event, it became clear that the need for experienced medical 
professionals was a priority. Within hours of the levy break, calls went out nationwide 
expressing the need for medical health professionals; healthcare services were 
overwhelmed in Mississippi, Alabama, and most notably Louisiana. Requests for 
assistance were communicated through traditional emergency management mechanisms 
such as state emergency operations centers.Concurrently, states were investigating the 
availability of volunteer health professionals by pulling lists together recognizing the 
need to assess what impact the deployment of this work force would have on their home 
state. 
Early in the process it became clear that the demand for health professionals was 
not being met, through emergency management via the EMAC the national mechanism 
established for governmental agencies to share resources during an emergency and/or 
natural disaster. 
In an effort to expedite the identification and deployment of non-governmental 
health professionals, the DHHS contacted the American Hospital Association to seek 
assistance. A conference call was established with AHA Chief Executive Officers across 
the country requesting volunteers. To support this process, DHHS established a web site 
for the collection of health professional’s information in anticipation of deployment. 
Although thousands of individuals registered on the site, the mechanism to verify 
credentials, establish a set of core competencies and coordinate the deployment became 
extremely complex, which prevented contacted individuals from responding despite a 
continued demonstrated need. 
Although this activity did not successfully deploy needed resources, it reactivated 
a process for Washington to “federalize” private, non-governmental health professionals 
in the time of an Incident of National Significance specific to a public health concern. 
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Utilizing organizations such as the American Hospital Association, American Medical 
Association (AMA), American Osteopathic Association (AOA) and the American Nurses 
Association (ANA) provided important sponsorship by strong, political advocates. 
B. ENVIRONMENTAL SCAN SUPPORTING THE STRATEGIC IDEA 
Almost one year post-Katrina, there remains no mechanism to enlist and deploy 
private, non-governmental health professionals for an Incident of National Significance. 
Nationwide, the availability of governmental nurses and physicians is dwindling and their 
areas of expertise are not generally acute healthcare. The traditional public health 
infrastructure is currently being reinforced through the CDC bioterrorism preparedness 
funding, which includes adding staff across the country. However, most of these health 
professionals lack the current knowledge and training to function independently in a 
medical environment. They would also lack the skills to function in the currently needed 
high tech medical environment. The governmental “medical” health professionals 
currently employed nationwide most often work in a mental health or corrections 
environment. In addition, deploying these scarce professionals out of state facilities 
through EMAC would certainly leave a gap in the sending state. 
Each of the 50 state HRSA programs is coordinating a state based registry called 
ESAR-VHP. Working closely with each state based coordinator would provide the 
Principal Federal Official (PFO) a list of health professionals that agree to volunteer in an 
event. This established registry includes the verification of professional licensure and 
credentials to a level that is consistent nationwide. Establishing a mechanism to 
federalize those volunteers within the registry pre-event would expedite response and 
improve outcomes not only for those affected, but for those individuals who wish to 
volunteer thus share their unique skills and expertise. Again, this allows states to utilize a 
large number of highly trained, established health professional resources. 
C. ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS TO FEDERALIZING 
In an effort to demonstrate that the strategic plan for the United States 
government to establish a mechanism to federalize private, non-governmental health 
professionals, is a viable solution to a known deficiency, alternative mechanisms and 
associated challenges must be presented and reviewed. 
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One alternative would be that the current employer of the private, non-
governmental healthcare workers would continue to provide liability protection; as well 
as workers compensation and death benefits for any of their employees that responded to 
the call for assistance during an Incident of National Security. This would only be for 
those deployed as part of a state/federal deployment system. This process actually did 
occur during Katrina but not through the governmental EMAC process. Large health 
conglomerates such as Kaiser Permanente, working with DHHS, did deploy a team to 
Louisiana and covered all of their costs including necessary equipment, financial 
compensation for professional services and expenses. This is a unique situation as all of 
their health professionals are employees of the system and thus, are covered when 
performing any duties as directed by their employers. 
This activity was a win-win situation for Louisiana health system(s) and Kaiser 
who were able to meet their humanitarian mission. All financial support came from 
within the Kaiser system including their insurance carriers for issues such as 
compensation and liability. It should be noted that an impact statement from this 
deployment has not been released by the Kaiser system as of this time, so it is impossible 
to note the true costs of this effort (which may take years to determine should any of their 
employees suffer a negative outcome from this experience). Although this worked well, 
there are few healthcare systems across the country that fit this model. Most healthcare 
systems are independent and contract with their medical staff. Medical staffs carry their 
own insurance policies which detail where and how their coverage exists. Should a 
physician function outside these provisions, generally they are not covered. This simple 
fact, adds a complex layer for a health professional to independently volunteer, even as 
part of a health system team due to the insurance issues. 
In an effort to address this insurance issue, large malpractice and insurance 
carriers could modify existing policies to include the ability to cover their policy holders 
when responding to an Incident of National Significance. This would present a complex 
issue, not insurmountable, but may take years for such an industry to come to consensus 
on the terminology and benefits. Therefore, this could be an alternative that should be 
investigated for the long-term but will not provide a consistent, nationwide short-term 
method to address this short fall. 
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A second alternative would be the ability of a state in which the private, non-
governmental health professional works, to make individuals or groups “an agent of the 
state” for the purposes of deployment and would thus allow that individual to access all 
coverage as a governmental employee, most notably those outlined in EMAC. This 
mechanism will also present unique challenges starting with the basic notion from Article 
IV of the United States Constitution that ensures each state’s ability to form its own 
republic form of Government. Thus, all states’ structures vary and the ability to form 
such a proposal would require significant actions beginning with legal advisors within 
state level public health agencies. It would require extensive legal review and 
development of proposals that would need to be forwarded to the state Attorney Generals 
office, and ultimately forcing ratification of new legislative and gubernatorial activity 
within each state and territory. 
It should, however, be noted that most states, through their legislative acceptance 
of EMAC have established a mechanism to utilize private, non-governmental general 
contractors at the time of an emergency. When a state does not have enough resources or 
equipment to accomplish a task such as restoring power, clearing debris or search and 
rescue, they elicit the private contractors through established mechanisms to assist. 
However, this process does not exist for private, non-governmental health professionals. 
This may be due to the previous absence of the need for individuals with specific medical 
expertise in high volume necessary during Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Also, the 
magnitude of medical equipment and costs that need to be deployed in such a scenario 
may also be a factor in this limitation. 
It should be noted that several states, during the Katrina response, did enact an 
Executive Order to make a small number of private health professionals “agents of the 
state” to facilitate their response to the EMAC request. Although the numbers are small, 
these states and their eventual after action reports, including costs and future 
implications, may provide critical information for other states when making future 
planning decisions. Again, this alternative provides a potential solution to the challenge 
but is not one that can be immediately impacted due to the variation in state governments 
and the legal implications of such action. This should be a focus for future, long term  
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alternatives. However, it does not answer the immediate request for private, non-
governmental health professionals needed in the current or future public health focused 
Incidents of National Significance. 
D. NEW BUSINESS OR SET OF PROGRAMS NEEDED FOR THE 
STRATEGIC IDEA TO BE IMPLEMENTED 
The ability to federalize private, non-governmental health professionals will 
require specific infrastructure at the state level to support the requests from the federal 
government. This infrastructure includes a nation-wide standard mechanism to identify, 
register and credential health professionals in advance. With that comes the need to 
consistently identify necessary resources and resource typing such as: 
1. Equipment 
Each state would need to purchase and maintain computer hardware and software 
to support the maintenance of a database of health professionals and their verified 
credentials. This would most likely require a secure Internet site with redundant server 
back-up and mechanisms to access data in the event of a power outage. Additionally a 
basic set or template of deployable generic medical equipment, resource typed would be 
established nationally. This can range from basic first aid to sophisticated mobile medical 
facilities. The state would need to manage this inventory of equipment. It is recognized 
that this could occur through collaboration with private health entities. 
2. Training 
Specific programs would be a critical component to ensure that all personnel 
deployed have a minimal set of competency-based education and training. This would 
include knowledge about chemical, biological radiological, nuclear and explosive events. 
Mental or behavioral health aspects of responding over time in austere, difficult work 
environments as well as any specific equipment that would be expected must be included. 
Currently, the DHHS, HRSA contracts with University-based level Centers of Excellence 
as part of their Bioterrorism Preparedness programs. These centers could be tasked with 
developing specific coursework that would demonstrate a minimal level of competency 
prior to deployment. All of the management and tracking would be done within the 




Significant policy changes would be required at the local, state and federal levels 
to facilitate implementation. Most notably would be modifications to NEMA, EMAC, 
FEMA and federal processes that offer inclusion of private, non-governmental health 
professionals more broadly into personnel and resource typing guidelines. EMAC 
processes would identify mechanisms to federalize private, non-governmental health 
professionals, thus providing them comprehensive coverage. State and local government 
and private agencies processes would develop specific policies on the deployment, 
backfill and parameters of the federal governmental deployment. 
E. STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 
(SWOC) ANALYSIS AND STRATEGIC ISSUE DEVELOPMENT 
Stressing the importance of the DHHS and DHS National Priority of medical 
surge capabilities, the federal government’s ability to implement the appropriate 
protections necessary to utilize private, non-governmental health professionals is a 
critical first step. This would significantly support local and state initiatives as well. 
1. Strengths 
• DHHS has multiple health-related agencies that have information on their 
specific mission and/or capability. This would include the HRSA 
programs; NBHPP, ESAR-VHP, and EMS, primary care initiatives such 
as Migrant and Rural Health and Federally Qualified Health Center 
Programs. 
• DHHS post-Hurricane Katrina had an opportunity to evaluate their 
response and identify and implement opportunities for improvement. This 
includes the issue surrounding private medical health professionals. 
• Other departments within the federal government have resources to 
contribute to improved capability and response. This would provide them 
the opportunity to utilize such resources by integrating current silos that 
exist in planning and implementing a response. 
• DHS has become the overall coordinating agency of 22 previously 
separate agencies that have responsibilities for homeland security and 
defense. It is critical that DHHS and DHS have established relationships 
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both vertically and horizontally. This should include databases of 
resources and personnel available to assist for significant events. 
• Two agencies within DHHS, CDC and HRSA, work with state public 
health agencies that are responsible for medical and public health. 
Through this relationship, a network of professionals exists whose primary 
function is to maintain responsibility for coordination of planning and 
response within their states. These 62 grantees have tremendous resources 
available at the local, regional and state levels. 
• DHHS also has access to and a working relationship with the Public 
Health Service, the United States Department of Veterans Affairs and 
other governmental resources that have medical personnel to assist in an 
event. 
• HRSA has ESAR-VHP. This is an initiative that is being rolled out in 3 
phases, but establishes a minimum standard for all 62 grantees (states and 
territories) to collect and credential volunteer health professionals. These 
would be pre-certified and available should a mechanism be present to 
deploy them for assistance inter or intra-state. 
2. Weaknesses 
• Compartmentalized structure exists within DHS and the previously 
independent 22 agencies. 
• CDC and HRSA need to improve coordinating efforts at the federal level 
between their agencies despite the two national priorities of medical surge 
and mass prophylaxis. 
• Lack of consistent mechanism to credential healthcare professionals 
whether governmental or non-governmental. 
• The ESAR-VHP program is still in development. Ten grantees are in 
phase 1 (initial) and have a registry in place; 22 grantees are in phase 2 
and are at varying degrees of implementation. The remaining 30 grantees 
are just starting the process as phase 3 states. In addition, the ESAR-VHP 
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program at the national level has not finalized guidelines for credentialing 
or the technical standards of the program for the grantees. Therefore, no 
two systems are alike or finalized as of the date of this writing. 
• Lack of national, consistent mechanism that enables the utilization and 
deployment of private, non-governmental health professionals. 
• Minimal governmental medical resources to meet the needs of an Incident 
of National Security. This was demonstrated during the Katrina response 
and continues as of this writing. 
• Lack of consistent mechanism to cover the issues of liability protection, 
workers compensation or death compensation nationwide for private, non-
governmental healthcare workers. 
• Efforts to establish basic mutual aid between healthcare systems within 
states is complex and inconsistent inter and intra-state. This fact 
complicates the ability to expand beyond a single event to one of multiple 
states. 
• The legal milieu within the United States complicates the ability for 
private, non-governmental healthcare professionals to leave their normal 
work environment and volunteer during an event. 
• Many health professionals would put themselves at risk regardless of the 
lack of protection provided or the conditions in which they would practice. 
This willingness to serve, thwarted during Katrina may effect a homeland 
security response in the future. In addition, a lack of structure for 
coordinated deployment results in spontaneous unsolicited volunteers, 
(known as suv), also risky to those responders and those coordinating the 
response. 
3. Opportunities 
• Developing independent systems for deployment that would meet the 
needs of various health professionals across all 50 states and territories 
would be impossible. Developing a system that is coordinated at the 
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federal level would provide support to states and territories. This system 
could establish a baseline credentialing system and establish consistent 
training, education and exercising capabilities. 
• Demonstrate strong, collaborative leadership of the federal government to 
local and state government and the private sector. 
• Demonstrate that the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina supported 
the federal government action to address the issues associated with care of 
large numbers of victims, including when healthcare facilities can no 
longer deliver care. 
• Significantly improve morbidity and mortality associated with a mass 
casualty or other public health emergency. 
4. Challenges 
• Variation among health professionals and expertise and the need to 
establish baseline competencies with education, training and exercises. 
• Making non-governmental health professionals “temporary unpaid 
government employees” presents significant paperwork issues that must 
be streamlined pre-event to expedite deployment processes. 
• Communication consistently to all 62 HRSA grantees in a manner that 
fosters trust and collaboration between the federal government and state 
government. Currently, a lack of trust related to a states volunteer work 
force exists…what will happen once they forward the information to the 
federal system? A concern that the federal government will keep a 
database of those previous volunteers and not continue to work with state 
processes that have been established. 
• The financial implications of making non-governmental employees, 
temporary governmental employees specific to workers compensation and 
death compensation. Potential long-term financial drain on federal 
budgets. 
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• Health professionals want to volunteer and will often deploy outside of 
structured systems. A solid structure must be instituted to avoid 
spontaneous volunteers and encourage following a consistent system to 
identify and deploy. 
• Maintaining interest and attention of identified volunteers in the absence 
of an Incident of National Significance and deployment. 
• Mechanism to pre-credential and identify a high level expertise of health 
professionals. 
F. BENCHMARKING 
Benchmarking this initiative will be difficult because no system at the federal 
level exists with which to accurately benchmark. A process will be developed to review 
experience of those states that had established a system to urgently deploy private, non-
governmental health professionals during Hurricane Katrina. The states that established 
such systems did so in collaboration with their state government enacting an Executive 
Order to cover their employees as “agents of the state”. Although it is early to assess the 
impact of this activity, especially related to long-term implications on those governments, 
this small set of data will be useful. Each of the 62 HRSA ESAR-VHP programs will 
report a set of “best practices” or challenges. 
Another important source of data will be the review of the collaborative effort of 
DHHS with the AHA database to identify health professionals to deploy. Although over 
33, 000 volunteer health professionals signed onto the database, a significantly lower 
number were deployed due to the complexity of credential verification and process 
associated with deployment. However, both of these systems have valuable information 
to use to benchmark a more sophisticated, well thought out system than that which 
currently exists. 
Finally, those private health systems that deployed resources, whether via pre-
established mutual aid agreements between corporate facilities in the affected areas or as 
part of their humanitarian efforts, should be contacted and a comprehensive review for a 
SWOC analysis of the activity should be conducted to help establish recommendations 
and alternative methods. A brief description of the plan will include: an extensive review 
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of each of the ESAR-VHP programs for the ability or inability to deploy private, non-
governmental health professionals; an extensive review of the private health systems that 
deployed personnel as a result of pre-established mutual aid or humanitarian efforts, 
assessment of current capabilities to utilize this specific group of persons, determine best 
practices identified during Hurricane Katrina, analysis of action steps to meet 
deficiencies, including consistent credentialing, training, education and exercising of 
those individuals; and draft a strategic plan for deploying private, non-governmental 
health professionals investigating all alternatives; federal, state and individual 
organizations. This plan would then be shared with stakeholders for review and revision 
as necessary. Then those stakeholders that are influential to the success of the process 
would be enlisted to assist in moving the project forward. It will be important to 
efficiently move the process forward, making necessary modifications as needed. 
G. DRIVING THE PLAN 
A critical component for implementing this plan is the identification of the four 
organizational hurdles to strategy execution. For the purposes of this activity, the driving 
organization will be the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) that has 
coordinated the activities of the inter-state mutual aid agreement known as EMAC. This 
compact forms the basis of mutual aid and deployment of resources for all 50 states. This 
compact is designed specifically for inter-state mutual aid agreement of governmental 
entities. Since this plan focuses on the need to identify and integrate private, non-
governmental resources into the EMAC process, it is helpful to identify the four 









                                                 
64  W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy: How to Create Uncontested Market 
Space and Make the Competition Irrelevant (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2005), 150.  
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Many believe that the EMAC system is not broken, thus no need to modify. There 
is a lack of recognition that medical personnel are not currently part of EMAC.  
Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the urgent need and shortcomings in governmental 
medical resources and the ability to mobilize them at the onset of the event. Nearly one 
year later, medical services have not been 100% resolved and significant gaps continue to 
exist. EMAC requests continue to the states for physicians, nurses and medical para-
professionals. 
1. Motivational and Political Hurdles 
The driver of the plan should work with National Associations such as the 
American Medical Association, American Health and Hospital Association and American 
Nurses Association as these organizations have significant membership that were and 
continue to express concern with the availability of medical services in Louisiana. In 
addition, they hold significant lobbying power in Washington. All of these organizations 
had ground up movement of their membership to try to assist during Hurricane Katrina. 










• NBHPP Coordinator 
• ESAR-VHP Coordinator 
• FEMA V Region 
di
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2. Resource Hurdle 
The NEMA may be unable to grasp a process to identify and manage the 
identification, credentialing process, and deployment of private, non-governmental health 
professionals across the country. This would be a formidable task for one association 
working with federal agencies due to the diversity of systems and processes. Each state 
has a NBHPP as part of DHHS preparedness funding. The state coordinator of this 
program has direct contact with both hospital and pre-hospital health professionals 
working to establish intra-state regional preparedness initiatives. This person should be 
accessed for knowledge of state specific resources, including political climate of the state 
on this issue. Each state, through a DHHS preparedness initiative has an ESAR-VHP 
Coordinator. Their position, present in all 62 grantees is responsible for establishment of 
a state volunteer registry developed to meet minimal technical guidelines established by 
DHHS. The registry would provide immediate access to names and significant 
credentialing and educational backgrounds of those registered. The NEMA, working with 
state emergency operations centers could work directly with the one state coordinator to 
assist in identifying and mobilizing these important resources. This would also enable the 
sending state to maintain knowledge of any resources deployed out of their state and 
when those resources return. This would help ensure the state medical system and their 
citizens are not put into jeopardy by minimizing access and possible redundancy in a state 
specific event. 
H. PILOT INITIATIVE TO IMPLEMENT THE PLAN 
Michigan could serve as a state system to pilot the process and implement the 
plan to utilize private, non-governmental health professionals during an Incident of 
National Significance. Since the DHHS NBHPP and ESAR-VHP point of contact in 
Michigan has an extensive experience in emergency preparedness and could serve as the 
single point of contact. In this role, the responsibility to maintain an extensive list of all 
180 hospital Chief Executive Officers, 800 Life Support Agencies Medical Directors as 
well as the 24/7 contact information for the Medical Coordinating Center in each of 
Michigan’s Eight Emergency Preparedness regions facilitate immediate access. In 
addition, this position sits on the State of Michigan, Emergency Management Homeland 
Security Division (EMHSD) State Coordinating Committee(s) which serves to monitor 
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and implement the activities of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) granting 
process statewide. This includes the identification and management of personnel needed 
during an event that would necessitate the standing up of the State Emergency Operations 
Center. The Michigan Community Health Emergency Coordinating Center serves as the 
lead agency for an ESF#8 events, working specifically on the identification, coordination 
and communication of health professional volunteers and medical resources with the 
SEOC. 
The pilot in Michigan would include the pre-identification of a core group of 
health professionals that have volunteered through their ESAR-VHP registry (found at 
www.MIVolunteerRegistry.org). Currently there are almost 900 registered volunteers. 
Once a core group representing diverse healthcare professionals and expertise was 
identified within the registry, their credentials would be verified. This verification is 
based on the Interim Technical and Policy Guidelines, Standards, and Definitions of the 
DHHS ESAR-VHP Program. This includes relevant education, professional training, 
licensure, certification, and clinical practice information. Since the ESAR-VHP is a 
national program, the credentialing components establish common personnel resource 
definitions that will make ordering and dispatching personnel during an incident more 
efficient and work to ensure that authorities receive the personnel they need during an 
emergency or disaster.65 This Michigan group would receive specific training 
opportunities that would be exercised at least semi-annually. Concurrently, mechanisms 
for their deployment, including identification of EMAC components and mechanism to 
work with their primary employment agencies would be established with those key 
stakeholders that are part of this core team. 
All activities would be established in conjunction with current emergency 
preparedness initiatives at the local, regional, and state levels to ensure activities do not 
happen in specialty silos. In addition, since this is a pilot project routine conference calls 
with NEMA and other federal agencies as identified would be established, based on the 
status of the project to keep initiatives on track and/or make modifications as necessary. 
                                                 
65 Emergency System for Advance Registration of Volunteer Health Professionals (ESAR-VHP) 
Program, Interim Technical and Policy Guidelines, Standards, and Definitions. Division of Healthcare 
Preparedness, vol. 2, Health Resources Services Administration (Washington, DC: Department of Health 
and Human Services, June 2005), 29-30.  
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This would include timelines and deliverables. Should this core team and processes prove 
to be successful in the early stages, Michigan could work with the FEMA Region 5 
Coordinator to identify a border state to begin a similar project. 
Mr. Edward Buikema is the current FEMA V Regional Director. His former 
position was as the Commanding Officer of the Michigan State Police Emergency 
Management Division. This historical relationship has worked favorably for Michigan 
through a continued close collaboration of Michigan State Police and Community Health 
administrative team. This includes opportunities to lecture at Michigan conferences 
forging that continued knowledge of Michigan structure and initiatives. He is 
knowledgeable of the challenges of private, non-governmental health professionals, the 
local and state emergency management resources and maintains the broad federal 
perspective. During Hurricane Katrina, Mr. Buikema was deployed to Washington, DC to 
staff the National Resource Coordination Center (NRCC).66 Mr. Buikema has been 
briefed on this proposal and has agreed to provide information if necessary that could 
assist in moving the pilot project forward. This may include communication with other 
FEMA departments and administration and more importantly the NEMA Administrative 
Staff. His support of this project lends significant validity to the importance of 
recognizing the inherent challenges and assisting in federal intervention strategies that 
may be necessary as the pilot unfolds. This would reinforce the important need for 
mechanisms to provide inter-state support during a significant incident. 
                                                 
66  Edward Buikema (FEMA Region V Director), interview with author, Troy, MI, March 31, 2006. 
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Ability to Federalize 
Volunteers
 
At all times, the Michigan Department of Community Health Director and the 
Office of Public Health Preparedness Director would receive activity updates to ensure 
that the Department, Governors Office as well as the Attorney Generals Office was 
informed of this pilot project initiation. As this is an election year, all efforts to identify 
the progressive and important nature of this pilot project to the Governor Office may help 
ensure responsive actions, mechanisms to support the pilot and a platform to notify the 
Citizens of Michigan of this innovative preparedness initiative. Thus providing the 
important link to citizen and industry buy in. 
Individual healthcare professionals, Michigan health professional organizations 
such as the Michigan’s State Medical Society, Osteopathic Association, Nurses 
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Association, Respiratory Therapy Association, and healthcare facilities and systems 
statewide continue to express significant support of any preparedness activities that 
incorporate private sector consistent with the direction of the National Response Plan. 
The ability to capitalize on the frustration expressed with Hurricane Katrina response to 
market and publicize both the registry and the pilot initiative can significantly drive this 



























The implementation of the ability to federalize private, non-governmental health 
professionals during an Incident of National Significance would bridge a significant gap 
that currently exists in the ability of the United States to adequately respond to a public 
health and/or medical health event. It is recognized that this is a substantial undertaking 
that requires close collaboration of local, state, and federal governments with private 
industry. However, the federal government has recognized that one of the seven national 
priorities must address the ability to surge the medical system. This will be unattainable 
without significant modifications of the system as it exists today. When state and local 
resources are exceeded during a catastrophe, the role of the federal government is 
particularly vital and “would reasonably be expected to play a more substantial role than 
in an ‘ordinary’ disaster”.67 
Using Michigan as a pilot site with support of the FEMA Region V Division 
Director allows a controlled process that once tested and modified can be adapted across 
the country, utilizing the valuable wealth of private health resources available and more 
importantly, providing economy of scale. The proposal to develop a team of health 
professionals for intra-state and possible inter-state deployment is consistent with a 
recommendation contained in an EMAC 2004 After Action report. The recommendation 
to deploy complete teams of personnel with a designated leaders or coordinator proved 
the most effective structure for managing and controlling resources during the event. 68 In 
addition, the Hurricane Katrina After Action Reports reinforce the need to more fully 
integrate the private and non-profit sectors into their planning and preparedness 
initiatives. This includes the designation of specific individuals, again could be a state 
level coordinator, to work directly with private sector organizations and elicit input for 
planning, training and exercises.69 
                                                 
67 Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared Executive Summary, 4. 
68 2004 After-Action Report Hurricane Response (Lexington, KY: National Emergency Management 
Association), B - 13, NEMA.  
69 Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, 20. 
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In February 2006, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned 
was published. This document contains critical information that can and should be used 
to address issues and provide opportunities for improvement in all sectors at all levels. 
The following quotation reflects our future: 
Hurricane Katrina prompted an extraordinary national response that 
included all levels of government – Federal, State and local-the private 
sector, faith-based and charitable organizations, foreign countries, and 
individual citizens. People and resources rushed to the Gulf Coast region 
to aid the emergency response and meet victims’ needs. Their actions 
saved lives and provided critical assistance to Hurricane Katrina survivors. 
Despite these efforts, the response to Hurricane Katrina fell far short of the 
seamless, coordinated effort that had been envisioned by President Bush 
when he ordered the creation of the National Response Plan in February 
2003. Yet Katrina creates an opportunity-indeed an imperative-for a 
national dialogue about true national preparedness, especially as it pertains 
to catastrophic events. We are not as prepared as we need to be at all 
levels within the country: Federal, State, local and individual. Hurricane 
Katrina obligates us to re-examine how we are organized and resourced to 
address the full range of catastrophic events-both natural and man-made. 
The storm and its aftermath provide us with the mandate to design and 
build such a system.70 
 
                                                 
70The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned, 3.  
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APPENDIX A—RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA SURVEY 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey.  This survey will be used as 
the data collection tool for a Masters Thesis at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS).  
The thesis will be a case study of Hurricane Katrina focusing on issues associated 
with mutual aid mechanisms to deploy private, non-governmental health 
professionals. The results of the survey will be confidential, not anonymous, please 
indicate state______________________.  
 
For the purpose of this tool, health professionals are defined as any licensed provider 
such as physicians, nurses, behavioral health and emergency medical services 
personnel. “State” is defined as any governmental entity that was involved in the 
response to Hurricane Katrina requests for assistance.  
 
1. Was your state involved in any way with the requests for health care personnel to the 






If no, end of survey please return survey to: 
Linda Scott     scottlin@michigan.gov 
Michigan Bioterrorism Hospital Coordinator 
Michigan Department of Community Health 
Office of Public Health Preparedness 
201 Townsend St. 
Lansing, MI 48909 
 
2. How were the mutual aid requests handled in your state?  (Choose all that apply): 
  Emergency Management Assistance (EMAC) 
   State Level Compact 
   Local Jurisdiction 
   Private/Industry Compact ie: hospital to hospital 
  Other:  
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3. Were any state health resources mobilized outside of the governmental mutual aid 
structure? Such as private EMS agencies/vehicles, health related personnel etc.  
  No       Yes 
 





4. How does your state address the issues of liability for volunteer health professionals, please 





5. How does your state address the workers compensation coverage for  





How does your state address the death benefit for volunteer health professionals, please be 






6. Did your state government enact any executive orders to enable the deployment of private 
health professionals to the Hurricane Katrina area? 
 
  No        Yes 
 
 







Would you be willing to share a copy(s)? 
  No 












Upon completion of this survey please submit to: 
 
Linda Scott 
Michigan Bioterrorism Hospital Coordinator 
Michigan Department of Community Health 
Office of Public Health Preparedness 
201 Townsend St. 
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APPENDIX B—SURVEY TOOL WITH COMMENTS 
 
1. Was your state involved in any way with the requests for health care 
personnel to the Hurricane Katrina effected area? 




2. How were the mutual aid requests handled in your state? 
Emergency Management Assistance 
(EMAC) 
30 
State Level Compact  6 
Local Jurisdiction  6 
Private/Industry Compact 12 
Other 11 
• Emergency Management Agency 
• Deployed volunteer healthcare workers to hospitals, intra-state etc. in Alabama gulf coast 
communities. 
• State Health Department, however we were not successful in providing volunteers because 
no request was received through FEMA/XEMA.  We received word from the affected states 
that they needed healthcare volunteers, but because the requests didn’t go through FEMA, 
we could not address protections for the volunteers.  There were a few private entities 
(hospitals) that sent teams and individuals who went on their own.  We have an ESAR-VHP 
program in place for nurses so we intended to use that system to call upon nurses. 
• Requests through associations (hospital, primary care, mental health, maternal child 
health) 
• Federal MRC deployed state MRC to gulf coast states 
• Some hospital deployed on their own, outside of the EMAC 
• Feds “willy-nilly” cherry picking assets  
• A ESF#8 supporting agencies veteran administration and the red cross 
• Governor’s Executive Order 
• Medical Reserve Corps – American Red Cross 
• Volunteers were self deployed after reported mass calls for mutual aid by the media and 
HHS 
• Agreements with: Faith Based Community, National Guard, CDC, Law Enforcement, 
University of XXXX for Medical Sciences 
• Some healthcare provider volunteers who had registered with a Medical Reserve Corps 
unit were deployed as MRC volunteers with other relief agencies, such as the Red Cross.  
These MRC volunteers were the only deployed volunteers to the Gulf area other than state 
employees (aside from self-deploying individuals and those who went with a church group) 
 
3. Were any state health resources mobilized outside of the 
governmental mutual aid structure? Such as private EMS 
agencies/vehicles, health related personnel, etc. 
No  9 
Yes 20 
Unknown  2 




If yes, describe any impact on your own states medical resources. 
• No significant impact 
• Office of Emergency Management were sent.  Key personnel, especially from OEM was 
going for prolonged period of time 
• We sent 12 EMS crews and ambulances to Texas for 2 months.  No impact on EMS 
coverage in state.  There were various health professionals who deployed on own with 
various not for profit entities, but some were deployed through the state 
• For the shelter established for evacuees, it was hard to fund nurses for coverage.  
Community healthcare centers were used for chronic care.  Private EMS were used for 
transport of evacuees. 
• Without a system in place to deploy resources in a controlled manner, self-dispatching of 
EMS agencies, hospital staff, etc. impacts our state in that it reduces the number of 
volunteers that would be available to respond to any state response. 
• Depleted the states resources to respond to another event 
• EMS agencies sent ambulances through FEMA.  They did not report problems. 
• Very limited resources in XXX to start with.  Significant confusion as requests came from 
federal agencies through various associations essentially ignoring the National Response 
Plan.  Some requests came by EMAC, a tedious process.  Other deployments, such as 
DMAT, National Guard. 
• As soon as we realized that there were efforts underway to deploy state resources outside 
of the state emergency response structure, we took efforts to coordinate with the various 
organizations/agencies involved in order to not adversely affect the state response. 
• Hospital personnel did not use our structure exclusively.  Emergency Medical Services did 
use the state EMAC system for deploying. 
• There was no significant impact on health resources.  However, the impact on Medicaid 
Funds was substantial. 
• Private sector staff was deployed using a Governor’s Executive Order 
• National Medical Reserve Corps partnered with the American Red Cross to deploy 
healthcare professionals.  Of the 350 MRC members deployed, 64 were from XXX.  The 
XXX Hospital Association developed teams to be deployed following HHS procedures.  No 
XXX hospital teams were formalized or deployed. 
• 1 team of 4 WIC volunteers from the XXX Department of Health and Human Services 
• We had some ambulance services from our eastern border cities that deployed with 
another states team. 
• Breakdown in communication – unsure if state health resources were mobilized 
• There were several evacuees that had serious, acute and/or chronic medical problems that 
needed immediate attention.  The XXX Bureau of Emergency Medical Services coordinated 
with local ambulatory care to transport those patients with serious medical conditions to 
local hospitals. 
• We are aware of some hospitals and private EMS services that deployed either on their 
own or via a request from private organization, etc.  The only impact was regarding the 
confusion related to reimbursement.  The state works only under the auspice of EMAC as 
the legal and reimbursement issues are covered when deployed under this compact. 
• Other than self-dispatched volunteers, private EMS agencies and vehicles were utilized 
only after pulling them into the state process of becoming state assets allowing for EMAC.  
It was difficult to utilize private entities and faith based groups because they are not 
specifically addressed in the Stafford Act or EMAC. 
• There were not as many health care professionals here to help when the evacuees came 




4. How does your state address the issues of liability for volunteer 
health professionals, please be specific? 
Treated as state employees                                                                                     10 
EMAC                                                                                                                         5 
Declared disaster                                                                                                       3 
Specific statutes                                                                                                         3 
Working on the process                                                                                             3 
No process in place                                                                                                   2 
Establish a Memorandum of Understanding                                                             1 
Good Samaritan Laws                                                                                               1 
Dedicated team                                                                                                         1 
Being considered/received presently 
• We have a state website where volunteers register and electronically sign.  This signature 
covers them under state policies. 
• Just passed legislation on 5/5/06 that gives them liability protection (medical agencies) if 
they are under the direction and control of a state agency and are not being paid while a 
volunteer. This was not in place during Katrina. 
• XXX has liability protection for its MRC members under general municipal law section 
XXXK which allows our volunteers to be considered extensions of XXX Department of 
Health workforce if volunteering for us. 
• Volunteers, health and non-health, were required to sign a volunteer form; making them 
“agents” of the XXX, allowing them liability coverage 
• The XXX Attorney General’s opinion is that volunteers who are deployed through the 
Department of Health have the same liability coverage as state employees. 
• If an individual or state asset go through our emergency management structure, through 
EMAC, they become “agents of the state” and designated as part of Civil preparedness 
force.  Only then will liability, worker’s comp and death benefits be covered by the State, 
the same as it would for a State employee. 
• Under EMAC liability issues are covered 
• Through the specific state EMA Act and state department of public health rules and 
regulation, state based emergency response team members are considered non-paid state 
employees during state declared disasters. 
• During a statewide emergency they would be considered state employees.  XX has a law 
that eliminates liability concern for health care agencies if the governor determines the 
system is overwhelmed and they operate with an approved plan. 
• We are still working on it with proposed new legislation.  Right now the governor can 
declare an emergency and issues such as professional license statutes can be ‘relaxed’ but 
liability cannot.  If our licensees went to another state, they would have to rely on that 
state’s protections, if any. 
• Current plan is to provide liability coverage for identified/verified and pre-credentialed 
health professionals to be made “emergency state employees” to provide liability and 
workers compensation and accidental death benefits as well as a salary and appropriate 
travel costs.  Pending approval by legislature and governor. 
• Our state has passed legislation to provide liability protection for Medical Reserve Corp 
volunteers.  We integrated our MRC and ESAR VHP programs to cover hospital volunteers.  
We also have the ability to designate “free clinics” which offers some liability protection. 
• A MOU was created making the volunteers state employees. 
• Volunteers are handled through EMAC; therefore their liability is covered. 
• It has been addressed through the Good Samaritan Act.  Anyone including healthcare 
personnel volunteering their services are protected. 
• Our state was not able to deploy healthcare workers, although we worked with EMAC to try 
to establish a list of volunteers based on their requests.  Our state’s volunteer system was 
not in place to allow a timely recruitment and deployment.  So, although liability was under 
discussion, we never actually deployed workers. 
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• For particular emergencies there is not establish a Volunteer Health Professional in hospital 
setting yet. 
• We have several statutes that provide immunity.  We also used the Governor’s Executive 
Order and EMAC provisions. 
• SBXX was signed out January 11, 2006, after the Hurricane Katrina event. 
• XXX Lay Title 37-B, Title XX of Main Emergency Powers defines volunteer health 
professionals as members of emergency management forces and act as agents of the 
State. 
• We have not yet solved this issue.  For out of state deployment they were made temporary 
employees of the state. 
• This is an issue we are currently working on.  Currently only during times of a state disaster 
are the volunteers covered.  All state employees that were deployed were covered by the 
EMAC agreement 
• Employees of the state are not liable for the exercise or performance, or the failure to 
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty, in carrying out emergency 
management provisions of Chart 2, Title XX. Rev. Stat. 26-314(A).  Emergency 
management provisions instituted during Governor declared, “state of emergency”.  
Immunity not extended to willful misconduct, gross negligence or bad faith.  Volunteers 
enrolled or registered with a local or state emergency management agency during a 
declared “local” or “state of emergency” under the authority of Title XX are treated just as 
officers and employees of the state who perform similar work for liability purposes.  
Immunity extends to the performance of training for authorized functions or duties. 
• XXX passed legislation XXXXX Disaster medical assistance teams a few years ago giving 
the department authority to establish public health response teams.  Since then XXX has 
developed medical and environmental health response teams and is in the development 
stages for an epidemiology response team.  With the legislation any member of a public 
health response team that acts pursuant to the division of the chapter in law is considered 
an employee of the state under chapter 669, shall be afforded protection as an employee of 
the state under section 669.21 and shall be considered an employee of the state for 
purposes of workers’ compensation and death benefits provided they follow a number of 
requirements.  The teams include both public and private partners. 
• Volunteer health professionals in the state of XX practice under their own liability or that of 
which entity they are associated with.  There is currently no mechanism for in-state 
volunteers to be protected under state liability or workman’s comp. 
• If health professionals volunteer and operate under the umbrella of the XXXX Department 
of Health and Human Services, it is in our opinion that they are assumed employee status 
and would be covered under XXXX policy.  Also, XXXX has a law (Act XXXX, House Bill 
1236, Regular Session 2005, Subtitle; an act to establish a statewide mutual aid system, 
amending XXXX Emergency Services Act code 12-75-103) that defines emergency 
responder and protects those who volunteer during a state of emergency from prosecution.  
•  Individuals registered as Medical Reserve Corp members are given sovereign immunity 
from liability to the same extent as are state employees performing their assigned duties.  
This liability protection for MRC volunteers protects them from civil liability if they provide 
aid or treatment in good faith, absent of gross negligence and do not receive any 
compensation for their services.  This applies when the volunteer is engaged in emergency 








5. How does your state address the workers compensation coverage 
for Volunteer health professionals, please be specific? 
Treated same as state employee                                                                               10 
No process in place                                                                                                      8 
Currently working on process                                                                                       4 
EMAC                                                                                                                           4 
Established an MOU                                                                                                     1 
Purchased a specific compensation policy                                                                   1 
Rely on “parent employer”                                                                                            1 
Dedicated team                                                                                                             1 
Under review currently 
• We have a state website where volunteers register and electronically sign.  This signature 
covers them under state policies. 
• We are awaiting direction from XXX on this issue.  We are hoping/expecting that it will 
eventually be provided by the state. 
• Liability protection (medical agencies) if they are under the direction and control of a state 
agency and are not being paid while a volunteer as state employees go to max limits 
provided to state employees. 
• Volunteers, health and non-health, were required to sign a volunteer form; making them 
“agents” of the XXX, allowing them liability coverage 
• There is currently no legislation that addresses this, however, at this time, if a volunteer is 
injured in the service of the state, they could file a claim with the Board of Adjustment. 
• If an individual or state asset go through our emergency management structure, through 
EMAC, they become “agents of the state” and designated as part of Civil preparedness 
force.  Only then will liability, worker’s comp and death benefits be covered by the State, 
the same as it would for a State employee. 
• Under EMAC liability issues are covered 
• Through the XEMA Act and XXPH rules and regulation, XX medical emergency response 
team members are considered non-paid state employees during state declared disasters. 
• Local event = local coverage, state event = state coverage 
• It is our understanding that our state would be responsible for workers comp of XXX 
volunteers if the state deployed them.  If they volunteer on their own they would be covered 
by the employer IF the employer sent them as their employee.  Otherwise, they have no 
guarantees. 
• Currently None exists. 
• MRC is covered under the state workers compensation program when deployed as part of 
an official state response effort. 
• A MOU was created making the volunteers state employees. 
• Volunteers are handled through EMAC; therefore, their workers compensation is covered. 
• That is still being debated.  The current thought is that if they are operating in an official 
volunteer capacity, the state will assume this responsibility, but it is not yet settled. 
• This issue was a topic of discussion and still is to this day with respect to our ESAR VHP 
program. 
• Cannot answer 
• Private sector and state employees covered under state law and Governor’s Executive 
Order.  Local government employees covered under employer provisions. 
• No 
• LD XXXX clarifies that health volunteers who sign up through the XXX Emergency 
Management Agency become agents of the state. 
• We have purchased a policy for our volunteers.  When we deploy them we pay the 
individual premium cost and submit the names and SS# within 72 hours. 
• This is an issue we are currently working on.  Currently only during times of a state disaster 
are the volunteers covered.  All state employees that were deployed were covered by the 
EMAC agreement. 
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• Emergency workers and volunteers have immunity from liability, exemptions for laws, 
ordinances and rules, and are eligible for all pensions, relief, disability workers’ 
compensation and other benefits that apply to the activity of officers, agents, employees or 
emergency workers of the state or any political subdivision when performing their 
respective emergency functions. 
• At this time XXXX does not have a mechanism in place to cover this situation. 
• In a word…..we don’t, or not yet at least. It is my understanding that under EMAC, the 
receiving state shall provide or reimburse for workers comp coverage, but for Non-EMAC 
response, we are relying on the “parent employer” (in many cases, hospitals) to maintain 
workers comp for their volunteer employees.  Whether they will honor this or not is not 
known. 
 
6. How does your state address the death benefit for volunteer health 
professionals, please be specific? 
Currently no process                                                                                                  11 
Covered as state employees when working in that capacity                                        6 
EMAC                                                                                                                           4 
Working to address issue                                                                                             3 
Unknown                                                                                                                      3 
Rely on “parent employer”                                                                                            1 
Establish a MOU                                                                                                           1 
Dedicated team coverage                                                                                             1 
• There is none at this time.  If it should be created for volunteers we expect it will come from 
the state level. 
• Only benefit is through worker’s compensation.  However, if professional is part of a mobile 
response unit, they may have an additional death benefit.  Law is not real clear in this area. 
• I don’t know? I don’t recall the issue arising. 
• File a claim with the Board of Adjustment. 
• If an individual or state asset go through our emergency management structure, through 
EMAC, they become “agents of the state” and designated as part of Civil preparedness 
force.  Only then will liability, worker’s comp and death benefits be covered by the State, 
the same as it would for a State employee. 
• Unsure 
• Through the XEMA Act and XDPH rules and regulation, XXX team members are 
considered non-paid state employees during state declared disasters. 
• They would pay equal to a similar job class at the state.  That is a problem when you are 
discussing physicians who are independent practitioners. 
• If the governor declares an emergency then this could be addressed in his declaration.  
However, it is not assured that he would do this.  Bottom line: we are not sufficiently 
prepared for this. 
• Currently none exists. 
• Not addressed at this time. 
• A MOU was created making the volunteers state employees. 
• Volunteers are handled through EMAC; therefore, any death benefits offered through 
EMAC would be covered. 
• Not yet addressed 
• Currently not addressed 
• Cannot answer 
• Private sector and state employees covered under state law and Governor’s Executive 
Order.  Local government employees covered under employer provisions. 
• No 
• Not yet addressed 
• This is an issue we are currently working on.  Currently only during times of a state disaster 
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are the volunteers covered.  All state employees that were deployed were covered by the 
EMAC agreement. 
• Activity of officers, agents, employees or emergency workers of the state or any political 
subdivision when performing their respective emergency functions are eligible for state or 
local jurisdiction death benefits. 
• There is no death benefit in this state for volunteer health care professionals outside of 
those affiliated with a fire department or law enforcement unit. 
• Again, at this time XXXX does not have a mechanism in place to cover this incident. 
• Again, same as for workers comp.  If the volunteer has an employer who provides death 
benefit coverage, the state expects (but cannot compel) the employer to provide if the 
volunteer is killed while volunteering.  I believe that many private life insurance (and auto 
coverage if killed in an auto accident while deployed as a volunteer) will honor the policy 
death benefit. 
• XXXX stated that individuals were deployed without a clear understanding of the issues of 
protections. There was clearly a lack of understanding of the issues associated with private, 









7. Did your state government enact any executive orders to enable the 
deployment of private health professionals to the Hurricane Katrina 
area? 
No 25 
Yes  5 
Not Sure   3 
 
 
If yes, please describe actions taken: 
• Order to empower one or more mobile support units. Included allocating resources that 
include personnel, governmental and private medical responders that offer assistance. 
• MOU process with volunteers to make them “agents of the state”. 
• Governor issued executive order to make private sector staff deputy directors of XXXX 
Department of Homeland Security for purposes of deployment. 
• Executive order making them temporary state employees 
• By the request of the governor executive orders and licensure board resolutions were 
enacted to waive residency requirements for health care professional evacuees in XXXX 
temporarily for these people to be able to practice in XXXX.  Also, executive orders were 
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